

JPRS-NEA-89-074  
17 NOVEMBER 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Near East & South Asia**

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JPRS-NEA-89-074

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17 NOVEMBER 1989

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## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

### Mubarak on PLO Talks, Arab Relations

44230022B Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew  
22 Sep 89 pp 13, 16

[Interview with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak by Dan Avidan, in Cairo; date not given; first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] This week at his Cairo palace, President Mubarak had an extensive meeting with Arab affairs correspondents, after which he met and had a talk with DAVAR's correspondent in Cairo. Here follows the complete version of that interview.

[DAVAR] We want to thank the president for agreeing to meet with us after a lengthy period in which he did not meet with Arab affairs correspondents.

[Mubarak] "It is not true that I didn't meet with Israeli journalists. I met with some in Ismailia during Minister 'Ezer Weizmann's last visit, and at the ceremony at which Tabah was returned to Egyptian authority. When journalists ask to meet with me I respond positively. We don't fear you the way you fear the PLO...."

[DAVAR] What is your scenario for the next stage, following your meeting with Minister Rabin?

[Mubarak] "During my talks with Rabin we exchanged views on the subject of Shamir's initiative; we discussed Egypt's 10 points—which I don't view as an initiative. It is not meant to be a counterinitiative to yours. We view the 10 points as clarifications that the Palestinian side needs in order to come to negotiations. Rabin and I agreed on many points. There was understanding between us. He understands our outlook and I understand his. We agreed that he would report to the government and to Prime Minister Shamir, so that the cabinet can debate the points we discussed. As for the scenario desirable to us; we have to know in what direction elections in the territories will lead and what their purpose is. That is why we sent the 10-point document to the Israeli Government, in order to receive clarifications concerning its political initiative. You do not trust the PLO, and the PLO is suspicious of you. We must break this stalemate. We asked for clarifications from you, and we hope that your response will be comprehensive and that an Israeli delegation and a Palestinian delegation will be able to have a dialogue without preliminary conditions. Such dialogue will not commit either side to anything, and it can take place just as I had a dialogue with Minister Rabin or with Peres at the time, for the purpose of arriving at an understanding within the framework of negotiation dynamics. After all, both sides are convinced of the importance of peace and both want to reach what is known as a safe haven. You have been fighting Arabs for 40 years. You have not tasted peace in these 40 years and you may be having difficulties appreciating its significance. As long as you remain a country of killings and massacre you will not know what security

and immunity are. You have no idea what it means to live in peace and security, how it feels to move freely among neighboring Arab states and to make friends. Egypt and Israel fought each other until a few years ago, but they finally conducted negotiations and reached a peace agreement. Today you come to Egypt as tourists. Does anyone attack you? On the contrary; Egyptians are people, too, whatever their religion. We want to live next to you as people, in peace and friendship instead of buying arms, killing each other, and causing orphans and unhappiness. What I say is, come and talk to Palestinians. Israel is a state. It has land. The Palestinians still don't have a haven. Talk to each other. Don't say that you're willing to talk only to West Bank and Gaza residents. You must understand that we don't exert ourselves just for the interests of one side. We hope to achieve peace. Peace is a great thing, especially for those who haven't experienced it yet. Don't be so suspicious, don't say, 'so and so wants to kill us, the others want to fight against us.' Iraq doesn't want to fight you, nor does any other Arab state. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn clearly told me that he had no wish to go to war with Israel. Neither will Egypt fight against you, if you don't go to war against it. Does Jordan intend to attack Israel? Actually, Jordan is de facto at peace with you."

[DAVAR] Is 'Arafat willing to begin preliminary talks with an Israeli delegation?

[Mubarak] "Why wouldn't he be willing? He is. Frankly, you are the ones who refuse to begin a dialogue."

[DAVAR] Israel's prime minister and all the Likud ministers are opposed to the principle of territories for peace. How then will Egypt promote the political initiative?

[Mubarak] "You tell me how we can make progress if you don't give me something I can use to promote the process. You, the Israeli people, must respond. You must deal with this logically. Even though I am the president of Egypt, I cannot force the Egyptian people to do anything against their will...."

[DAVAR] What is now the main obstacle to opening preparatory talks in Cairo? Is 'Arafat against them or Israel? Is the problem the composition of the Palestinian delegation?

[Mubarak] "You cannot have a dialogue with residents of the territories without the participation of Palestinian representatives from the outside. Of that I am convinced. I have it from authorized sources that that cannot happen. With all the respect I have for those views, you are banging your head against the wall with your insistence on talking only to Palestinian delegates from the territories. Outside Palestinians have an influence on those who live in the territories, and the latter cannot initiate anything on their own. You must make a gesture so that we can make progress toward peace. I will bring Palestinian representatives from outside, two to three acceptable, moderate deported Palestinians, or



some with U.S. citizenship. What impact can two outside Palestinians have on a delegation counting 10 representatives from the territories?"

[DAVAR] Will they be members of PLO bodies, such as the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)?

[Mubarak] "Forget the PLF. We will bring Palestinians who want to live in the homeland, who want to live in peace, and who want to visit you in Israel."

[DAVAR] The PLO insists on the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

[Mubarak] "First talk about (elections) and then deal with political negotiations and with the question of who among the refugees want to return at all. The Palestinians who live in Egypt are not refugees and have long been permanent residents. They have property in Egypt, their children and families were educated and grew up here. Even if the Palestinian problem is solved, they will not want to leave here. The refugees who live in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, and elsewhere are also already settled and I seriously doubt that they will want to return to a Palestinian state. If you keep emphasizing that you will not allow refugees to return to their homes, they will want to do it all the more. Give them freedom of choice."

[DAVAR] There are extremist Palestinian groups opposed to any political negotiation. That is why some Israelis claim that there is no point in having negotiations with 'Arafat because he doesn't represent all Palestinians.

[Mubarak] "'Arafat has his opposition, too. Do all Israeli parties want peace? No. You are a democratic state with a whole range of views. 'Arafat has opposition groups in the PLO and even within the Fatah, which does not mean that 'Arafat's approach to negotiations is negative. We work both with you and with the PLO in a reasonable manner for the purpose of achieving peace in the area."

[DAVAR] Can peace be achieved in the Middle East without Syria's participation?

[Mubarak] "How? Isn't Syria a Middle Eastern country?"

[DAVAR] Are you willing to mediate between Syria and Israel as you are doing now between Israel and the Palestinians?

[Mubarak] "The Palestinian problem is the core of the entire dispute. Once that is resolved, the entire dispute will be resolved."

[DAVAR] Even the Israeli-Syrian dispute?

[Mubarak] "Certainly. Syria, too, is interested in peace."

[DAVAR] In what situation would Syria agree to sign a peace agreement with Israel?

[Mubarak] "First we need to sit down and reach an understanding, to agree on the principles of an accord, and to have a dialogue. In other words, let us first agree on certain points and reach a compromise, through intermediaries, on some bones of contention, and then we can progress to the next stage, namely agree on how to continue negotiations and what an agreement should look like. We must take one step at a time."

[DAVAR] Can you name two or three outside Palestinians likely to be in the delegation?

[Mubarak] "We will name them after they have been accepted. Already in 1985 I asked the Americans to begin a dialogue with the PLO so that they can understand that organization's viewpoint. George Shultz opposed it in March 1985 saying it was impossible. In 1988 I had a telephone conversation with Shultz and I asked that the United States do something. They agreed to begin talking to the PLO. It took 3 years to convince the United States to do so. Now I tell Israel the same thing. You still refuse to talk with the PLO, but in 3 years you will. You must grasp that there can be no solution to the Palestinian problem without the involvement of Palestinians living abroad."

[DAVAR] But the Israeli government insists that it will not conduct negotiations with the PLO or representatives of exiled Palestinians. How do you respond to Israel in this connection?

[Mubarak] "I suggest bringing two outside Palestinians that do not represent the PLO to the talks. That's simple. They will be known as representatives of some group or other."

[DAVAR] Do you think that the ball is now in Israel's court?

[Mubarak] "The ball is now in your court, but you are using it for all sorts of games."

[DAVAR] What is Egypt's view of a comprehensive agreement in the area? Does it have to include an independent Palestinian state?

[Mubarak] "I don't want to talk about that. This is one of the disputed points that has to be negotiated. If we want to begin a dialogue now, we must circumvent problematic issues like that and leave them for later. In the end a logical solution will be found, for example, a Palestinian state linked with Jordan in a confederation. But the problem is that ahead of anything else you say you are against the establishment of any Palestinian state."

[DAVAR] What are your conditions for meeting with Prime Minister Shamir?

[Mubarak] "I am concerned with ensuring good relations between the Egyptian and Israeli nations. If I met with Shamir today and suggested a political dialogue with Palestinians, and he refused, and nothing concrete came out of the meeting, the Egyptian people would resent the Israeli people, and that's something we don't need."

Prime Minister Shamir and I can meet only if we know from the start that it will yield some results in the direction of the peace process. There is no room here for gambling. I am not a person who takes chances. I know how the Egyptian man in the street will react if a meeting between myself and Shamir ends without results. The next day, if not the same, you will be criticized for making a mockery of Egypt, and Egyptians' attitudes toward Israelis who visit our country would change. That would be the reaction of the man in the street, not of the Egyptian Government. I don't want to bring about dispute between Egyptians and Israelis....The entire atmosphere would change. Our meeting must yield results, and I am hopeful in this respect."

[DAVAR] If Shamir agrees to have outside Palestinians as members of the delegation to talks with Israel, will you then agree to meet with him?

[Mubarak] "If we come to an agreement about Palestinian representatives and a conference, and if we jointly announce the time and place of the conference, then I would arrange a meeting with Prime Minister Shamir."

[DAVAR] If Israel in the end rejects Egypt's 10-point plan, will that have a negative impact on bilateral relations?

[Mubarak] "No. But it will signal that you are not interested in promoting relations with Arab countries. You must sit down to talks with Palestinians. Such a dialogue can allay their fears. You can receive from them assurances and proof that they want peace, and if those assurances are violated, the whole world will be on your side."

[DAVAR] Will you support a demilitarized Palestinian state?

[Mubarak] "You bring up subjects whose time has not yet come. We don't need to complicate matters from the start. We must take one step at a time and at each stage resolve another specific problem. That will establish trust between the sides and negotiations can be pursued more easily. At the moment there is no trust between Israel and the Palestinians, and we serve merely as carrier pigeons between you."

[DAVAR] There are many cooperation agreements between Egypt and Israel that have not been implemented to this day. When will there be complete normalization between the two countries?

[Mubarak] "Egypt has cooperation agreements and protocols with all the countries of the world, not just with Israel, but we implement only those we need. We have signed agreements on cooperation principles, which we implement as the need arises. Stop the state of war and allow Egyptian citizens to go to Israel without fear, and you'll see progress toward normalization. Protocols are not decisive in this respect. What is decisive is the psychological attitude. When the Egyptian citizen sees

that the intifadah has stopped and that violence is dying down, he will not be afraid to visit Israel."

[DAVAR] But not many Egyptians visited Israel before the intifadah, either.

[Mubarak] "Not true. Some Egyptians do visit Israel."

[DAVAR] You mentioned that Iraq is not interested in going to war against Israel. Are there other Arab countries in that position?

[Mubarak] "Jordan doesn't want war with Israel. There is de facto peace between you and Jordan. It is true that Israel fears that Arabs have belligerent intentions, but I personally can tell you that we have no intention to go to war, because war will not solve any problem. All the Arab countries want to resolve the dispute with Israel through peaceful means rather than war. There must be negotiations."

[DAVAR] Recently it was said in the press that Egypt and Iraq are cooperating in the manufacture of the Condor-2 long-range missile. In Israel this is not viewed with favor.

[Mubarak] "You have been living in fear since 1948."

[DAVAR] The question is whether military cooperation between Egypt and Iraq does not have a negative impact on chances for peace.

[Mubarak] "At the moment there are no plans to build Condor missiles. The project is closed. It is not true that Egyptian experts were recently injured in the explosion at the Iraqi missile installation."

[DAVAR] However, in certain circumstances, military cooperation among Arab countries may be of concern to Israel.

[Mubarak] "You cannot stop Arab countries from cooperating among themselves in military areas. You have no right to interfere in this matter, unless the cooperation is directed against you, and that is not the case. You yourselves manufacture the Jericho ballistic missile and have tested it over the sea."

[DAVAR] But Iraq is developing a huge army....

[Mubarak] "I can guarantee that the Iraqi Army has no intention of fighting against Israel."

[DAVAR] Is Iraq still worried that Iran may resume the war against it?

[Mubarak] "No. The Iraqi Army is not worried about the Iranian Army because it is stronger and better. But I heard Israeli estimates that as soon as it finished fighting against Iran, Iraq would turn around and go to war against Israel. What could the Iraqi Army possibly want on the Israeli front? As far as the missiles are concerned, I'm prepared to scrap them, if it's bilateral. You destroy your missiles, and we will destroy ours."

[DAVAR] What is your view of the Fatah congress decision to "escalate the armed struggle against Israel?"

[Mubarak] "Fatah incorporates many groups. There are groups opposed to 'Arafat. As in any parliament, when the leader wants to get a decision passed, he has to 'give' the opposition something, and that is what 'Arafat did at the Fatah congress."

[DAVAR] Can Egypt bring pressure to bear on the PLO not to demand, at the very beginning of negotiations, a date for opening negotiations on a permanent settlement of the territories issue?

[Mubarak] "The PLO needs assurances in order to join the political process without apprehension. Each side wants to enter negotiations with a clear picture of the process. The PLO wants to know in what direction it is going. The fact that Israel refuses to talk about the form that a permanent settlement may take makes the PLO doubt its intentions. It causes mistrust. The sides need to know on what track they're getting, and that can be found out within the dialogue I suggested."

[DAVAR] If the Israeli Government accepts a Palestinian delegation with outside representatives, will 'Arafat agree?

[Mubarak] "Yes, he will agree. There is no problem there. The picture will clear up after your cabinet discusses the proposal, after I meet with Ministers Arens and Peres in the United States, and after they return to Israel. I hope that the Israeli Government will accept the proposal. An acceptable Palestinian delegation will discuss with the Israeli delegation ways and means to hold elections in the territories: how they will be organized, how the voting will proceed, where the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] troops will be posted, and so forth. After the elections, when Palestinian delegates have been chosen, a Palestinian delegation will be named to negotiations, as agreed by the two sides at the preliminary dialogue."

[DAVAR] Can a permanent settlement be discussed at the preliminary dialogue?

[Mubarak] "It certainly can. The dialogue should touch on all the stages, so that each side will know the other side's positions and so that negotiations can unfold. In the end an agreement will be reached, just as it happened in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. It may take some time, but the results will be positive."

[DAVAR] The discussion on the Egyptian initiative may bring down the national unity cabinet in Israel and lead to early elections. What do you think about that?

[Mubarak] "I'll tell you frankly: you'll be better off not wasting time dissolving this cabinet and forming another. The more time passes the more the damage increases. You must shorten the process. I hope that the present government will begin the dialogue with Palestinians and will set down principles for political negotiations."

[DAVAR] Has 'Arafat named outside Palestinians for the dialogue with Israel, and is Israel now expected either to accept them or suggest others?

[Mubarak] "The issue of the persons who will form the Palestinian delegation must be decided by mutual agreement, not by haggling. The ball is now in your court."

[DAVAR] 'Arafat has already come up with names of candidates?

[Mubarak] "I have not yet received any names from him. There must first be agreement in principle (on participation of outside Palestinians in the delegation). I don't see that the names will be a problem. There will be no negotiations without representatives of outside Palestinians."

[DAVAR] Will Egypt support border changes between Israel and a Palestinian state, such as leaving Jewish settlements in the Jordan Valley?

[Mubarak] "This is not an issue to be discussed now. Listen to my advice and leave that to a later stage. Were the negotiations machine already in motion and making progress, any Arab leader would be in a hurry to wrap it up and would be open to concessions. But if you begin negotiations on the thorny issues, progress will be all the more difficult."

[DAVAR] Is the question of resuming diplomatic relations between Egypt and Syria on the agenda at the moment?

[Mubarak] "I do not wish to talk about that. I met President al-Asad at the Arab summit in Casablanca in May, but beyond that I do not wish to comment on our relations with Syria. The Syrians are not talking about our relations either. There are no secret contacts between myself and President al-Asad. There are secret contacts between Minister Sharon and Rif'at al-Asad, President Hafiz al-Asad's brother."

[DAVAR] Will Egypt support a demilitarized Palestinian state?

[Mubarak] "The army of a Palestinian state at peace with Israel will not pose a threat to Israel. A Palestinian army is no threat to Israel."

### Israeli Tourists Arrested in Egypt

44230022D Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 18 Sep 89 p 5

[Text] The Foreign Ministry is concerned about the growing number of cases of Israeli tourists recently arrested in Egypt for possession of fake dollar bills. This issue, as well as problems concerning the discovery of weapons, drugs, and material suspected of being inflammatory in the possession of Israeli tourists trying to cross into Egypt, were discussed at a joint meeting of representatives of the two countries on the eve of the Succoth tourist season.



A senior Foreign Ministry employee in Jerusalem yesterday said that the Egyptian authorities are very sensitive to such offences by Israeli tourists, which immediately reach the highest political echelons. According to Egyptian authorities, 25 percent of the fake bills found on tourists were found on Israeli tourists.

Recently there has been an increase in the number of cases of weapons found particularly on Israeli tourists attempting to drive their cars into Tabah. In only 1 week in August there were five cases of weapons found on Israeli tourists trying to cross through Tabah. They involved innocent cases in which, for example, a citizen who had been on reserve duty had gun ammunition in his car.

Another problem that may escalate during the Succoth tourist season is drugs. The same senior employee yesterday warned in particular young people who intend to visit the Sinai sea resorts, not to give in to drug temptations, because the Egyptian authorities are very strict in this respect. In the past month they began a special restriction campaign. Two Israeli citizens suspected of drug dealing are currently in jail in Egypt. One of them, Yosef Tahan, is waiting for his death sentence to be carried out. The other, Doron Eshbal, has been held for several months and is awaiting trial.

Another problem concerns attempts to introduce into Egypt material that is viewed as inflammatory. Egyptian authorities recently arrested a young Israeli member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who was distributing material to border police. He was held for 2 weeks before Israel managed to get him out.

Some 50 Israeli tourists were arrested in the past year for involvement in serious offences of this kind. Approximately 20,000 Israeli visitors are expected to tour Egypt during Succoth.

#### **Israeli Firm Allegedly Involved in Syrian-Italian Trade**

44230022E Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 14 Sep 89 p 15

[Text] An Israeli foreign trade firm located in Tel Aviv has been serving for 2 months as intermediary in shipping some 1,000 tons of cotton every month from Syria to Italy. Syria is reportedly receiving \$2.5 million for the deal, which is scheduled to last 1 year.

The Israeli firm, whose owners are afraid to be identified, have close ties with the Italians. Their contacts with Syrian authorities were established by a Cypriot businessman who is taking care of the technical arrangements involved in shipping the cotton through Cyprus.

#### **'Club of Four' Viewed Likely To Isolate Syria**

44230022A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 18 Sep 89 p 7

[Article by Yo'el Ben-Porat: "Paupers' Pact"]

[Text] Since it became free of the Gulf war, Iraq has been tightening its political and economic ties to Jordan. Now there is talk of a "Club of Four," destined to serve as the nucleus of an Arab Common Market, with the addition of some old Arab dreams. The two leaders that interest us in this quartet are King Hussein of Jordan and President Saddam Husayn of Iraq.

Saddam Husayn is in King Hussein's debt for his political support at the time of the former's utter isolation during the war. Jordan served as a vital strategic connection axis from Aqaba to Baghdad through which passed almost all the weapons and logistic supplies purchased abroad for the Iraqi war machine. This axis was operated under the watchful eye of Israel, which could have disrupted it had it been interested in doing so. It is to be hoped that the Iraqis will remember their debt, or will at least view this Israeli gesture as repayment for the blown-up nuclear reactor.

In addition to the bilateral relations between Iraq and Jordan, there is a wider body that includes Egypt and Yemen, too. The missing link that could have added economic glue to the club is Saudi Arabia. In its absence, this is a "beggars" club in which only Iraq can become a source of assistance once its economy has recovered from the war.

Such a pact can create a military coalition option, because in addition to economic programs, military cooperation is taking shape between Iraq and Jordan. So far it is a matter of Iraqi air reconnaissance designed to bring its intelligence up on goings-on at the Israeli border. In the future, cooperation may involve bringing Iraqi troops into Jordan. I assume that all the sides are aware of the fact that Israel will not put up with such a development and will view it as a clearly aggressive act that will compel it to consider action.

Having said that, the picture that emerges and the direction it seems to be taking is not negative, on the contrary.

In principle, the above body is designed primarily to increase Syria's isolation, something that can only be positive, and to secure a dominant position for the two main partners, Egypt and Iraq. Egypt has a historical tradition of political and military hegemony among Arab countries while Iraq, in the past its principal rival, is currently viewed as a rising star and as a strong military power with economic potential. However, as we said, until Iraq has recovered and has realized this potential, what we have here is a paupers' pact.

Israel's main concern should be the political aspect of Syria's neutralization. If the pact survives, it will weave additional economic ramifications and will thus frustrate Syria's dream of reviving the eastern front against Israel. After all, Syria, which was and remains a threat to the Jordanian border and to the sovereignty and integrity of that kingdom, is, on the one hand, mired in the Lebanese bog, in which Iraq is also sticking its foot, while on the other hand it is exposed to an overt and covert

Iraqi threat on its border. Egypt and Iraq's political support may release King Hussein from the Syrian threat.

The 'Club of Four' may also become a leading factor in the topical issue of political initiatives to settle the Palestinian problem, in the process pushing Syria out of the picture and finally wresting control of the Palestinian issue from its hands.

In this respect each side holds a trump card. The Syrians will attempt to deter Jordan from participating in the plan and to take it out of the game. In view of the fact that massing Syrian forces on the Jordanian border is not now a practical step because of involvement in Lebanon and because of the Iraqi threat, they are trying to make trouble for Jordan and start a fight between it and Israel by permitting terrorist activities from its territory, through Jordan, and into the valley. However, it is to be assumed that this maneuver will soon end. Jordan and its king have good reasons to effectively block the hole in the fence in their own interests. Jordan is well aware that the existence of a strong, deterring Israel is the best guarantee for its existence and sovereignty. Consequently, not only will it not encourage terrorist actions initiated by Syria, but it will also not support the establishment of an eastern front against Israel, which is against its own interests.

Egypt, which has shaken off the "humiliation of Camp David" and has come out of its political isolation after almost all Arab countries renewed relations with it, plays an important role in the political alliance thanks to the Camp David accord and to its improved standing with the United States. Its good relations with the PLO, Jordan, and Iraq on the one hand and with Israel on the other make it into a promising intermediary. Moreover, the "Bloc of Four" is basically pro-Western and pro-American. Even Iraq, which in the past vacillated between the two camps, may come closer to it in view of the relations emerging between the Soviet Union and Iran, relations that may lead to arms supplies and a renewed war option for Iran. By being pro-Western, such a bloc, even if it is not operative in the area of political agreement, can constitute a neutralizing factor against Arab war plans against Israel.

If progress is made toward an accord—whether along the lines of Shamir's initiative or Mubarak's plan—the Syrians may find themselves pushed into a corner and may, according to some experts, embark on a military adventure against Israel. We dispute this interpretation, not only because of al-Asad's cautious and deliberate manner, but also because of his international and economic situation, the Lebanese tangle, the Iraqi threat, and so forth.

Iraq has the most options in this association. It is the stronger economic partner that in the future can finance joint projects and secure backing from American banks and governmental funds. It can also make al-Asad's life difficult and increase his military and political isolation.

Syria has almost no options at all. It has no actual means to torpedo the consolidation of the bloc of four; its influence on the PLO is waning, and its influence in the territories is not great. Soviet support carries no practical advantage in the current international configuration. Therefore, it is difficult to believe that al-Asad will sink to belligerent moves against Israel. He can flex his muscles by filtering terrorists through the Jordanian border, but that is merely a temporary option which, it is hoped, Jordan will utterly eliminate.

The PLO, too, has few options. It will probably continue to be the ball kicked by everyone: the Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Israelis.

Israel's duty is to seriously and thoroughly study the new constellation so as not to once again miss an opportunity to promote a possible accord. A situation may even emerge in which the "Jordanian option," in which Shim'on Peres still believes, may be reactivated. With Egyptian and Iraqi support, the Jordanians can allow themselves to meet Israel half way in spite of Syrian opposition, on the condition that the plan is coordinated with the PLO. The United States will certainly be in favor, and, if the terms of the agreement are satisfactory to all sides and to itself, the Soviet Union, while firing a few symbolic salvoes in Syria's support, may well take it as an opportunity to renew relations with Israel.

The trouble is, however, that options come and go, coalitions change, and new configurations emerge all too frequently. This makes it necessary for Israel to be able to make swift and firm decisions. Because of its present leadership, Israel is no longer a serious partner for negotiations. The Alignment is plagued by infighting, with doves on the one side, hawks on the other, fakes in the middle, and apathy all around. The Likud, immobilized by the constraints placed by Sharon, Levy, and Moda'i, is increasingly becoming a "rejectionist front" regarding any agreement negotiations. It kept waiting for contacts to blow up, and now a new disaster hit it, Mubarak's 10 points.

We Israelis always thought that there is no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. Now it is becoming clear to the world and to Arabs that they have no one to talk to. The Israeli leadership is reverting to the post 6-Day war mood, in which the government decided "not to decide" and many of its members adopted the procrastination method and proceeded to torpedo and throw wrenches into the wheels of any agreement. That is why the "building block" failed to become a "cornerstone."

#### **Study Indicates Syrian Progress in Nuclear Arena** 44230022C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Sep 89 p 1

[Text] "Israeli sources which closely follow events in Arab and other hostile countries are deeply concerned about a process of rapid change. In the past year Syria entered areas of research and development in microelectronics and nuclear chemistry and energy, and established institutes as centers of nuclear energy and

research," stated an article appearing in the publication of REFA'EL [Weapons Development Authority] researchers.

Articles by Arab scientists indicate a surprising "leap forward in quality, too," the publication added. "If a change does not occur and erosion continues in budget and in the standing of research, development, and higher education, our science and technology superiority over Arab countries is in palpable danger," said a senior defense-system scientist quoted in the article.

The publication also revealed that Syria is investing considerable effort in nuclear research and development, and that it is negotiating with Belgium and Switzerland on planning and building the first nuclear reactor in Syria, whereby its intention is to build no less than six nuclear power plants requiring the investment of some \$3.5 billion.

The author of the REFA'EL publication article, Ben-Tzvi, reported that the Syrians are simultaneously working to establish nuclear research reactors with Soviet and Italian assistance, and that they have recently begun searching for suitable sites.

## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### Proposed Palestinian Delegation to Talks Listed

44230019F Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 18 Sep 89 p 1

[Article by Uri Nir]

[Text] Public figures in the territories say that in the last few days there is feverish activity in the Palestinian arena in the territories and abroad for the inclusion of representatives from the leftist factions of the PLO in the framework of the proposed Palestinian delegation to the negotiations with Israel. According to the figures, the identities of the other representatives in the delegation, who are all identified with the PLO, have already been decided during quadrilateral discussions that were held in the course of the last month between figures from the territories, senior members of the PLO, Egyptian officials, and American diplomats.

The public figures from the territories said that the Palestinian leftist factions were offered two or three places on the delegation, which will number about 10 representatives from the territories and another two or three who will represent the Palestinian diaspora (Palestinian residents who were expelled from the territories). According to the accounts of those figures, the PLO will develop a mechanism for advising and controlling the position of the Palestinian representatives in the discussions, by means of constant contact between the representatives and two of the members of the Executive Committee of the organization, personnel of its diplomatic arm. Two names mentioned in this context were Hani al-Hasan and Mahmud Abas (Abu-Mazin).

These are the names of the proposed representatives for the Palestinian delegation, as they were noted up to now in various publications (reports in the Egyptian press, reports of public figures in the territories, and reports from Arab sources):

- Faysal al-Husayni, a resident of East Jerusalem, director of the institute for research and documentation that was closed by order of the authorities more than a year ago because subversive activity was allegedly being conducted there. He is considered by many to be the most outstanding active figure in the territories, and is identified with the central tendency in the PLO. He benefits from family recognition (his father, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, was the commander of the Palestinian forces in the '40s), from fame as a fighter (he was an engineering officer in the Palestinian Liberation Army in the '60's, and sat in Israeli prisons several times), and from fame as a public activist.
- Raduan Abu-'Ayyash, a resident of Ramallah, born in the 'Askar refugee camp near Nablus. He serves as chairman of the Journalists's Union in the territories, and manages an office for journalistic services in East Jerusalem. He was editor of the AL-'AWDAH bi-weekly, which was closed more than 2 years ago on the orders of the authorities. He is considered to be one of the most outstanding public figures in the territories, from the group that is identified with the central tendency in the PLO.
- Hanna Sinyura, a resident of East Jerusalem, editor of the East Jerusalem daily AL-FAJR, a pharmacist by profession. A Christian, he was the PLO candidate for membership in the joint delegation of Jordan and the Palestinians to the peace talks in 1985. He caused public outcry in the region when he announced his intention to participate in the elections to the Jerusalem Municipality in 1987, and when he called for a general civilian rebellion against Israel, including a boycott on Israeli products (at the beginning of the uprising). He participates frequently in conferences and conventions all over the world on the conflict.
- Fayiz Abu-Rahmah, a resident of Gaza, who serves as chairman of the Attorneys's Union in the Strip, was a PLO candidate for membership in the joint delegation of Jordan and the Palestinians for peace talks in 1985. He is known to have very close ties with the Egyptian administration. He participates frequently in conferences and conventions all over the world on the conflict. He recently aroused much criticism among Palestinians in the territories due to the "dovish" statements that he voiced on various occasions.
- Ilyas Frayj, the mayor of Bethlehem. One of the most prominent and active persons in the territories. A Christian, he has very close ties with persons in the administration and with public figures in the West, especially in the Christian world. He was identified as a definite supporter of the Hashemite administration in Jordan for many years, and has of late adopted a "national" Palestinian line. He also has excellent



relations with persons in the Israeli administration, especially in the Labor Party. He endangered himself several times by statements that angered persons in the extremist Palestinian factions, and recently also within the PLO. He was exposed to several attempts by extremist activists to harm him, and to threats upon his life. The last threat was published as a blunt statement by Yasir 'Arafat, which afterwards was officially denied, following Frayj's expression of support for a "cease fire" in the intifadah.

- Jamal al-Turayfi, a resident of Al-Birah near Ramallah, an attorney and a wealthy businessman, the son of a refugee family. About 3 years ago, he presented his candidacy to be mayor of Al-Birah, and the Israeli administration rejected him as a figure too close to the PLO. He enjoys good relations in Jordan. He was in the news recently following his meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir.
- Sa'id Kan'an, a resident of Nabulus. A very active businessman—Part owner of a soap factory, a tchena factory, and a cosmetics marketing company. He is identified with the pragmatic faction in the Fatah. For years, he was considered very close to the Hashemite court in Jordan. He heads several public institutions and charitable organizations in Nabulus. He is a scion of one of the old urban aristocratic families. He has excellent relations with several political leaders in Israel, mainly in the Labor Party.
- Muhammad Milhim, an expellee. He was born in the town of Halhul near Hebron. He was elected mayor in the 1976 race, and he was one of the members of "The Committee for National Direction" that was active in the territories during the years 1978-1982. He was expelled to Jordan in 1980, following the murder at Bet Hadassah in Hebron, despite the recommendation of the High Court of Justice against his expulsion. Afterwards, he was co-opted into the PLO Executive Committee, and he serves to this day as the head of the organization's department for the affairs of the occupied territories. He lives in Amman, and is considered one of the pragmatic figures in the PLO.
- Akram Haniyah, an expellee. He was born in a small village in the Al-Latrun area, and is a resident of the refugee neighborhood of Qaddurah in Ramallah. He is a noted journalist and author. He was the secretary of the "Committee for National Direction" in the territories, and afterwards was editor of the East Jerusalem newspaper AL-SHA'B. He was expelled in December 1986, following a lengthy appeal process and a large-scale public campaign on his behalf. He was accused of being one of the main activists of Fatah in the West Bank, and of having engaged in subversive activity. After his expulsion, he became one of 'Arafat's closest advisors, and was elected to the revolutionary council of Fatah.

Other names that were mentioned: As'ad Siftawi, a resident of the Gaza Strip who became known recently because of a peace plan that he wrote, which received a lot of publicity; the businessman Mansur al-Shawwa of Gaza, the son of Rashid al-Shawwa, who is considered to

have influence in the Egyptian and the Jordanian establishments and is close to Israeli businessmen and politicians; Ghassan al-Shak'ah of Nabulus, an attorney active in labor unions. He is one of the outstanding public figures in his city.

#### 'Iranian Source' Discloses Links to 'Hizballah of Palestine'

45000045 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 30 Oct 89 p 3

[From the "Bayn al-Qawsayn" feature]

[Text] AL-DUSTUR has learned from an informed Iranian source that the communiques that were distributed in southern Lebanon in the last few weeks signed by "Hizballah of Palestine" and containing severe criticism of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its leadership have been published in AL-ZAHRA', owned by the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. Their author is Dr Fathi al-Shiqaqi, leader of the so-called "Islamic Jihad in Palestine." [All quotation marks as published]

## ALGERIA

#### Roundtable Participants Discuss Prospects for Change

45190137 Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 4 Aug 89 pp 20-23

[Text of roundtable discussion moderated by Ziane Farrah for REVOLUTION AFRICAINE]

[Text] Electing new officials to the institutions of the FLN [National Liberation Front], relations with political parties, the general policies of elected officials, the preparation of elections at the commune and wilaya levels, and the future: These were the main issues debated at a roundtable discussion held last week by REVAF [REVOLUTION AFRICAINE]. Empty slogans were not the order of the day, to say the least. While the participants acknowledged the markedly positive nature of efforts to restructure and broaden the party's base, they were very careful not to issue good marks indiscriminately. Until the FLN's program is adopted by the Congress and made public, support from the citizens will not be as strong as might be expected from the early signs that have accompanied political reforms.

The participants are, nonetheless, fully confident in the future, seeing no cause for alarm on the political scene from parties lacking grassroots support. It all rests, they said, on the credibility and popularity of our program and what we do concretely to carry it out. The participants at this roundtable discussion were:

- Boussaad Zalouk, a teacher, age 31, from the federation of Draa Ben Khedda;
- Bouallag Mostefa, principal of a CEM [college of intermediate studies], age 37, federation of Alger-Centre;

- Merkanti Khedda, computer specialist, age 37, federation of Blida;
- Amghar Allaoua, age 36, federation of Tizi-Ouzou; and
- Rih Youcef, an academic, age 40, federation of Rouiba.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] What has been learned thus far in the FLN's efforts to restructure and broaden its base?

[Merkanti Khedda] In Blida, we have seen moudjahidine—authentic moudjahidine—return in great numbers. Recent events, efforts by some to systematically destroy the FLN, probably offended moudjahidine pride and past memories. The second conclusion to be drawn is that the undeniable enthusiasm was directly related to the highly democratic nature of the elections—unrestricted candidacies and voting by secret ballot. We saw some institutions lose 75 percent of incumbents. No one was re-elected to the muhafadha office and only two incumbents in the kasma office received the activists' votes.

[Boussaad Zalouk] For us, the turnover was around 80 percent. None of the members of the muhafadha office of Tizi-Ouzou ran for re-election. At the federation of Draa Ben Khedda, only one former kasma secretary was re-elected as was an internal affairs officer. All the others are new.

[Bouallag Mostefa] There are differences from one region to another, but overall, the turnover was considerable. For us, the turnover rate was about 60 percent. Personally, I know that we lost some officers because of the restrictive conditions. For example, a kasma made up of 25 cells must have its office formed by the 25 cell secretaries, yet there must be qualified officers among the activists in these cells. Be that as it may, the election unfolded in a highly democratic way. No challenges have been noted as yet. In other respects, we found that the election favored certain social classes. There were few merchants or professionals. On the other hand, we found many teachers, young people, workers, and farmers. This leads me to conclude that the social makeup of the Front's human component is more in line with the aspirations of the masses. That does not mean that the election could not have included other backgrounds and professions and the activists have said so.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] Were there any disputes at the grassroots level?

[Bouallag Mostefa] Very few. There were challenges in El Harrach and Birkhadem where two kasma did not complete the process that left their seats in the federation vacant.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] You have just said that officers were lost. Was it because they were beaten by other political parties—since other parties are now active in Algiers—or for other reasons?

[Bouallag Mostefa] Some were lost to other political parties, but very few. Personally, I know of two activists who expressed political views that aligned them with other parties. But most of the losses were the result of activists holding back in a way, wanting to know the FLN's program before taking a definite position—particularly because their trust has been somewhat shaken.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] For many years, a hierarchy of relationships has reduced the Front's institutions to mere instruments of execution. But now, all positions of responsibility have been handed down through the ballot box. Can the relationships be reversed as a result?

[Bouallag Mostefa] The offices and institutions must now represent the grassroots level, express its point of view—the majority's point of view. To my way of thinking, the change must go beyond the federation to the central committee whose missions should be clear and in accordance with the wishes of the grassroots level. No more theorizing based on the supposed aspirations of the grassroots level. We need to have real representatives of the grassroots level emerge by democratic means in the central committee.

[Merkanti Khedda] I can add that today, we are aware of our increased responsibilities. Rigid, one-way relationships of the kind commonly seen in single-party governments are no longer possible. There is an awareness that relationships will no longer consist of officials ordering their subjects.

[Rih Youcef] The debates in the general assemblies and the concerns that were expressed have revealed an urgent need to build a Front that represents and expresses the ideology of the popular majority—not a Front of ruling officials.

[Boussaad Zalouk] I would like to go back to the subject of turnover to say that some activists—muhafadha secretaries and others—were not psychologically prepared to go back to the grassroots level....

[Merkanti Khedda] Anyone who wants to be in politics has to know what they want. There can be no higher-ups and subordinates. In the democratic countries, there are heads of government who run for local office at the canton level without flinching. An official has to make himself be accepted. He has to bend with the times. In the past, to be a muhafadha secretary.... Now, the times are different. Why should he not go back to the grassroots?

[Bouallag Mostefa] The truth is, how should a muhafadha secretary conduct himself towards the grassroots level? As a representative of the political leadership, of the system in power.

[Rih Youcef] What can be said is that we have democratically erected a Frontist framework capable of rallying activists and citizens on a massive scale and of achieving the goals of the people.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] It was announced that 140,000 new activists joined the Front in the space of 6 months. Do you take that as a good sign or are the numbers not enough?

[Bouallag Mostefa] In Algiers, we have not witnessed the enthusiasm that is being talked about elsewhere. In the interior, membership has, in fact, grown markedly. In my mind, the new memberships are based more on political conviction than on a program. I think that membership will build, particularly in the large cities, once we have a clear program. In any case, a membership motivated by concepts, some which may be outmoded, does not support political activity as much as the activists who believe in a program.

[Merkanti Khedda] In reality, there is another factor that complicates matters: The party has turned into a political business. We have made ourselves prisoners of statistical quantification. Every week, you are asked for statistics on the activists. We have even been told, "You should have 2,000 activists." It is absurd—it has discouraged membership. I can honestly say that, for me, an ordinary citizen who applies [incomplete sentence in source].

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] As stipulated in the Constitution, after 5 July all political parties were free to become active. How will the FLN deal with the other parties?

[Bouallag Mostefa] My personal point of view is that until the congress is convened, the FLN will have to deal with the parties in clear terms, in a dialogue with them that will help build the country. The starting point should be the conditions and problems of the Third World country that we are. I am personally opposed to a multiparty system, but I welcome dialogue with anyone if it is for the edification of the country and I will respect his point of view as long as he respects my principles. Why are we politically involved if not to build the country? Healthy competition—and I don't mean vying to win the most seats or settling old scores—can only serve the interests of the working masses. Having said that, I feel closest to the parties that most represent the aspirations of the masses, because the Front cannot be anything but socialist.

[Boussaad Zalouk] We are in no way afraid of the political parties. They are made up of Algerians. What counts is national unity and the edification of the country. Our activists will be able to draw on greater enthusiasm thanks to the competition created by the multiparty system.

[Amghar Allaoua] The multiparty system, in my opinion, and the FLN's relations with the other parties should be based on cooperation in everything that can be

of beneficial interest to all citizens. Compatible goals and consequently, peacefully competing ideas.

[Merkanti Khedda] We cannot really speak about the Front's relations until its program—which we hope will be a program for the majority—is drawn up.

[Bouallag Mostefa] Dealing with the parties is a dialectic necessity and it is part of human nature. In fact, the same dialectic existed inside the Front. It is true that the multiparty system was not a popular demand or a unanimously supported option, whereas the FLN is recognized by all and it rallies the masses around general appeals. But if the dialectic requires interaction with others, I am ready to accept anything but interaction with "France's party" because we are experiencing an economic crisis that could eventually open the door to neocolonialism. Outside of that, I will stand alongside any party that works with the workers, farmers and young people.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] Do you see the current clamor involving the formation of political parties as a reflection of the demands of the grassroots level or the result of competition between the parties' headquarters?

[Bouallag Mostefa] Whatever the case, we are not experiencing the competition and clamor at the grassroots level. In fact, these phenomena reach us mostly through the news media. For the grassroots level, there was the extremist socialist movement that worked underground and, since the 1970s, the Islamist movement. The other parties are present in the cities, but they stop there. They meet in hotels—the Es-Safir, El Djazair, Aurassi.... In fact, we do not see any proof of a party supported by the working masses. And I think that Article 40 of the Constitution that applies to all Algerians has simply created a race for power, and nothing more!

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] However that may be, given the erosion of trust—which resulted from advanced economic and social deterioration—it has become absolutely necessary to purify the ranks.

[Rih Youcef] Purifying the ranks is the one Gordian knot. I think it can be done with the program inspired by the grassroots level and with stricter by-laws and rules.

[Bouallag Mostefa] We have political parties now. A spontaneous purification is possible in that activists who no longer identify with the FLN's principles can move on to those parties. But the problem is present more at the top than at the grassroots level. For example, there are ministers who have no relationship with the FLN. The purification must take place because this is a class struggle, not an ideological struggle. There are groups, a bourgeoisie, hiding behind civil liberties and democracy. The struggle will take place between the disadvantaged classes and the classes that appeared in the 1980s whose adverse effects are can be partially attributed to the political leadership.



[Merkanti Khedda] It all boils down to a program. If the FLN wastes time drafting action plans and development plans that go unapproved by FLN congresses for implementation by FLN offices, individuals and groups will again take control of the Front and if that happens, the Front will have a long road ahead of it. On the other hand, if the aspirations of the activist base are acted on, the purification will take place by itself.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] All of this brings us to the FLN's program. How do you envision it?

[Merkanti Khedda] It should be drafted on FLN principles and it does not take a Saint Cyr military academy graduate to design it. In the 1976 National Charter, we agreed to give priority to housing, employment, health, and sports. But the state's money was wasted on super highways for cars, which are considered a luxury item, and the basic minimum needed to solve the problems of the citizens was confiscated. We currently have 1 million cars for 26 million Algerians. So I ask, in the past, was the FLN working in the interests of all 26 million Algerians? Everything is riddled with contradictions and that is what caused the erosion of trust. Today the FLN has a duty to draft a program that will respond to the hardships and problems of the working masses who make up the overwhelming majority of the population. Without demagoguery. For example, when housing becomes a crucial problem, the citizens should not be told they can find housing by signing up with the CNEP [Algerian National Savings and Insurance Bank] when vast numbers of people do not earn more than the minimum wage. When our young people are jobless and we continue to recruit on the basis of contacts or accommodation, there is nothing to draw the people's support.

[Bouallag Mostefa] It seems too soon to speak about a program, but whatever the program, it will have to have the grassroots level as both its source and its goal. It will also have to clarify concepts in the context of new realities: social justice, indebtedness...the nation's ranking and image. But above all, to support the program, there will have to be an executive of the Front to oversee its implementation and account for its progress. Monitoring is essential. Finally, a program of true national independence is necessary as we are far from it.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] We are at the eve of the first multiparty elections to be held in the communes and the wilayaat. Up to now, all the shortcomings of the elected assemblies were attributed to the party because of its responsibility in nominating and, in theory, its role as the primary overseer. How should those assemblies be viewed today and how should we prepare for the elections?

[Merkanti Khedda] Anyone who blames the FLN for the mistakes and shortcomings of the elected assemblies is guilty of "political profiteering." Because everyone knows that the party never actually set up the peoples' communal assemblies. Moreover, the assemblies do not

follow the FLN's program in the work they do; they apply every other program but the Front's. Why? First, because there are threats, posturing, interests, and more. People who have tasted power want to hold on to it. Another reason is that the evaluating is done mostly by the security divisions. The final reason and most serious of all is that once an activist is elected to an assembly, he begins to look on the FLN as nothing but a springboard, with no real power. He discovers who is actually running local affairs. The kasma does not evaluate the assembly much less choose its members. The kasma nominates, but the choice is made at a higher level, but not by party institutions.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] What is the solution?

[Merkanti Khedda] Members must be chosen locally. How can you expect people to evaluate candidates they do not even know? The choice should be made at the kasma and the federation—directly and without recourse to the use of files that was so detrimental. Anyone can make up a file on anyone else without the victim knowing it. We must be allowed to choose candidates capable of meeting the Front's requirements. The political associations will probably have their lists (although the associations have not reached the point of drawing votes), and then it will have to be seen whether the Front is present at the grassroots level or not.

[Amghar Allaoua] In my opinion, in rehabilitating the elected assemblies, competent, experienced, and—above all—charismatic candidates will have to be selected. In addition, activists will have to turn out in massive numbers to exercise their right to vote so that only the best will be elected and those who neglected their responsibilities will be voted out.

[Boussaad Zalouk] In the past, we had a single party, the only road to elected office. But once the election was over, the activists turned their backs on the party without any reaction from the party. What we need at present is strict selection and a system of sanctions to prevent unworthy activists from damaging the Front's image and credibility.

[Bouallag Mostefa] In my opinion, we should first agree on a definition of the concept of local collectivity. Local collectivity means a collective local life and consequently, the active participation of citizens and activists. Having said that, I do not approve of blaming the Front for the shortcomings of the elected assemblies. It is true that opportunists have used the party to gain office, but the greater problem is that administrative oversight—with its power to sanction—has replaced political oversight. The kasma's general assembly should evaluate the candidates, not the reverse. Political oversight must urgently be restored for all members of the administration. When a commune's deliberation is rejected by the Wali, it means that the grassroots' point of view is at odds with an administrative stance. In those conditions, how can fair, collectively approved, local development be achieved? How can massive support for such a

program by elected officials and citizens be ensured? How can an elected assembly that has no sovereignty in its decisions and means to carry them out be expected to produce positive results? We have to choose once and for all between the legal provisions and reality.

[Merkanti Khedda] It is easy for an administration that never goes out on a limb to talk of a fiasco. First we should determine whether the fiasco lies with the APCs [people's communal assemblies] or with the wilayaat. Who allocates housing and commercial space? The APC? Having said that, the human factor should not be obscured. A mediocre system inevitably elects mediocre officials. Today, because the truth is coming out and becoming definitive, we need competent men of experience, considered credible by the population, and who can be given the means to carry out their policies.

### **Authorities Allegedly Continue To Deny Passports**

900A0031A Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE  
in French 24 Aug 89 p 21

[Article by Meziane Ourad; first paragraph is publisher's introduction]

[Text] The Earth is round and immense, its peoples and customs are many. Who does not dream of taking to the road to discover them?

Back when we were children, we took delight in following the wispy trail of a plane with our wide-eyed gazes as it crossed the sky, a rare event that would suspend our game of marbles. We were still far from imagining that there might be an "elsewhere" over the horizon of our tiny world that was so immense in our hearts. That was our universe. But where (as we would wonder) were the "birds of iron" going? "Franza," our mothers would answer. Did that mean France was nestled somewhere between two big clouds?

Such was the beauty of our illusions that they could not survive for long. Our first geography lessons taught us that the Earth was one large globe, but, more so, that it was broken up into many protected territories. Long before any child's dreams had appeared and faded, men had created nations, just as they had created wars....

At a later age, we would go on to learn that no man is an island. A host of institutions guides us all from cradle to grave, clearly marking the way. When we come into this world, we do so first of all, administratively. Without an official birth record, we are nothing. The same is true when we come to the end of the road. Without a death record, we remain among the living....

In fact, the public authorities are everyone's first guardian in life, granting and denying permission. It is said that young minds are shaped by travel. A sorry understatement! Without travel and the encounters it makes possible, there is little sense to life. To travel is to breathe. Thus, the worst infringement on citizens' rights

in our minds—and the first to be perpetrated in Algeria—was the invention of the "exit visa" in the glorious and enthusiastic days of the revolution. Once that unpleasantness was over, another practice became common over the 10 years that followed. However unofficial, it was frustrating, revolting and utterly arbitrary. Crouched behind their mythical and sublime power, the "authorities," with all their departments and manpower, overstepped the bounds of the law whenever and however they pleased by refusing passports to thousands of citizens, some of whom were paragons of virtue. Naturally, the authorities in their motherly role rarely felt the need to provide an explanation and who would question their right to grant or take permission away, crush, trample, oppress, and imprison? No one or very few. The few brave souls who were aware of their rights, and who were determined to defend them, rarely managed to be vindicated despite court findings in their favor that went unenforced when no one could be found to implement them.

No matter how often we are told the contrary, the code of silence and the arbitrariness that comes with it prevailed in Algeria all the years that preceded this year of reforms and it remains to be seen what coming years will bring.

As to the Algerians who were deprived of the right to travel, two broad categories can be defined. First, the petty criminals, most often the victims of local abuse of authority. Even those who were not sentenced to the required 6 months in prison or loss of rights were refused passports. (Even with such sentences, they would have been eligible to receive a passport at the end of 5 years!) Second, the "politicals," the various movements that dared to take issue and were systematically subjected first to repressive actions, then to oppression through a series of unfounded public measures. The public authorities—or, let's be more precise, the police—almost consistently resorted to the revocation of passports, the most effective weapon they had in these cases. Examples of such cases are too numerous to be cited here. There are at least a half-dozen in our newsroom alone!

"In fact," says Mr Moncef Bennouniche, a lawyer and member of the Algerian League of Human Rights (LADH), "the authorities have always abused their prerogatives. Now that Algeria has a more democratic framework, the administrative and bureaucratic practices by which any public authority could do whatever it liked at all times must be thrown out. Take the example of driver's licenses. There is a law regulating the revocation of licenses, but we all know that the first police officer to come along can, with impunity, take your license away on any pretense!"

The practice of revoking or denying passports became illegal with the adoption of the new Constitution. In point of fact, says Mr Miloud Brahimi, president of the LADH, "the authorities no longer have the right to restrict a citizen's freedom of movement because Article 41 of the Constitution poses no conditions to that freedom, unlike the old Constitution that stipulated in

Article 57 that freedom of movement was guaranteed within the framework of the Law."

In Mr Brahimi's opinion, the new Constitution invalidates the 1978 order enumerating certain cases in which passports may be revoked. "That order must be rescinded," Mr Brahimi declares. Moreover, he rejects the notion that an attainer or loss of civil rights constitutes grounds for revocation: "There is no such thing as an attainting sentence in Algerian law because we believe that every offender can be rehabilitated."

We contacted the General Directorate of National Security (DGSN), or more precisely, those in charge of national records, and found them categorical: "The police now authorize all Algerians to obtain passports without any restrictions or discrimination."

The DGSN even challenged us to provide the names of citizens who had been denied passports. Better still, the police added that for its part, it takes a maximum of 8 days to process an application. Why, then, do some passports take months? "You will have to ask the authorities in the districts about that," they told us.

Mr Miloud Brahimi confirms that "the DGSN has settled practically all of the cases we put before it. It must be acknowledged that aside from a few individual cases that have not yet been dealt with, we have no cause for complaint where passports are concerned. We are well ahead of our neighbors...."

For his part, Mr Bennouniche acknowledges that progress has been made, but believes that much remains to be done: "The basic principles contained in the Constitution have fundamentally changed and the law must be changed to conform with these principles. New legislation should be considered because many aspects of the current legislation are inconsistent with the Constitution approved by the people."

According to DGSN officials, the Algerian citizen has acquired once and for all the right to move about freely. Thus, there are no more impediments to obtaining a passport. True or false? Time—and letters received in the mail—will bring us an answer to that question. In the meantime, however, LADH has already brought to our attention the case of 12 dock workers in the port of Algeria who were arrested around 1982, then released when charges were dismissed. They are still subjected to administrative harassment, the least of which is the denial of passports.

When we learned that the districts often deny passports to the unemployed, we expressed our concern to the DGSN. The DGSN is categorical on this point as well: "An occupation is not a condition for obtaining a passport. The police have never required proof of employment, but it must be added that no country in the world would grant entry to a jobless tourist.... An Algerian with a passport stamped "unemployed" would be turned back by any country."

It must be said that despite the restrictions that have prevailed up to now, the vast majority of Algerians have passports. More than 4 million of us—the equivalent of the work force—have passports! What explains this fascination with things foreign? What is attracting so many abroad? "That is what we should be asking ourselves. Instead of applying restrictions, we should be solving the underlying problems. The political and social malaise that Algerians have been living with is the reason they are leaving. We will have to take action rapidly to remedy the malaise if we want to keep our people here," Mr Bennouniche told us.

It is true that oppression comes more easily than solutions, but the new era of government by a state of law that began in October requires a new set of rules. The public authorities, as abstract as they may be, are essentially being forced to step down from their throne. From now on, they must accept the citizen for what he is; i.e., a human being.

But, supposing that as of now, no one can stop any of us from obtaining a passport, what good will it do us? Freedom of movement is undeniably a wonderful principle, but the best guarantee of that freedom is a foreign currency account—not our institutions—and there are not 4 million Algerians who have such an account.

#### **Doctor Criticizes Exploitation of Pharmaceutical Supplies**

90OA0031B Algiers ALGERIE-ACTUALITE  
in French 24 Aug 89 pp 16-17

[Article by Dr Smail Boulbina]

[Text] How is the field of medication faring? "Hamdullah," exclaimed Mrs Houria Mhamsadji, chief pharmacist at the Mustapha Hospital. For her and the 75 other dispensary pharmacists in the wilayas of Algiers, Tipaza, Blida, and Medea whom we visited, medication supplies are improving and are slowly becoming normal.

So used had we become to "aggressive" but justified protests from pharmacists, particularly from women pharmacists, that their new outlook was almost beyond belief. For years, "makan'ch" [meaning "there is none"] had been the pharmacist's refrain—the dreaded, curt reply that would send the patient on a "journey" from pharmacy to pharmacy until, having visited several, he would finally manage to have all his prescriptions filled. Suffering from the same syndrome, his doctor would dread a return visit, which invariably meant a change of prescription.

In hospitals the situation was even worse, since it was difficult for patients to be treated by the same doctor at every visit. In response to the deteriorating situation that threatened the credibility of Algerian medicine, the equivalent of "shock treatment" was put into effect at the beginning of 1988, followed by continuing "consolidation and maintenance therapy," which has made it possible to normalize the state of affairs in medications.



### The Difficult Years

In a communique on medication supplies (CREAD, May 1988), Dr Brahim Brahania states: "Disruptions seem essentially to be occurring at two points in the supply circuit: in inventory control and in the distribution network. Let's not forget that our country produces only a small portion of the medications we use. National production of pharmaceuticals can meet only 10 to 12 percent of the demand. As it is currently practiced, inventory control seems primarily aimed at preventing shortages through overstocking. As long as inventory managers do not have reliable ways of forecasting demand, shortages will continue to be their primary fear. However, surplus inventories are not a total guarantee against shortages in the event of excessive or erratic demand or to a lesser degree, the expiration of a product's shelf life. Disruptions can occur in companies where stocks are turned over very quickly and a coherent system of stock management is lacking. This is apparently the case at the three state-run distributors of pharmaceuticals. It has been demonstrated that with the institution of a rational system of inventory management, the average volume of inventory and the number of shortages can both be expected to drop, as paradoxical as that may seem."

### Openness

That was an assessment of the state of affairs in pharmaceutical supplies prior to 1988. The state-run companies have since been reorganized and distribution to hospitals is currently being decentralized. According to Mr Smail Bouzar, director general of ENAPHARM [National Pharmaceuticals Company], "supplies for hospitals are globally sent to ENOPHARM [National Pharmaceuticals Company] in Oran and ENCOPHARM [National Pharmaceuticals Company] in Constantine to be distributed to the health sectors in their respective regions. Beginning 1 January 1990, these companies will be solely responsible for distribution and supply in the health sectors of the eastern and western regions. ENAPHARM will concentrate on the central region, which covers 13 wilayas. Thanks to this decentralized structure, distribution can only improve: The health sectors will receive supplies once a month rather than once every 3 months and the CHU [university hospital centers] will receive supplies twice rather than once a month. In the central region, two new distribution centers have been opened to serve dispensaries, one in Baraki and the other in Tizi-Ouzou. A third, now being converted, will open in Chlef."

In hospitals, particularly in the larger ones, however, the lack of forward-looking inventory management remains a major stumbling block, as pointed out by Mr Yahia Dahar and Mr Abdelmadjid Tefiani, two public administration graduates specializing in health. With few

exceptions, hospitals order supplies as needs become apparent. Each of the hospital's own departments place their orders in the same way. There are few pharmacists who are also capable of managing, because our pharmacists are not trained in management techniques and only the more highly motivated among them are able to develop this skill on the job.

Mrs Mhamasdjji, whose pharmacy at the Mustapha hospital has been using computers since 1988, says that "in 3 months, a pharmacist can be trained in the scientific management of medications at INPED [National Productivity and Industrial Development Institute] or through special training programs given by such health organizations as the INSP [National Public Health Institute ?]."

It is inconceivable that pharmacists are not trained in management techniques, while the Parnet paramedical school in Algiers offers training in pharmaceutical management to its skilled health technicians who will be working for these very pharmacists.

It has become important to upgrade the profession of pharmacist, a vital member of the hospital staff. They should receive appropriate training and be made full members of the medical committees.

In the distribution of medications to dispensaries, it would be cost effective to permit the establishment of distribution cooperatives in the wilayas. The state-run companies should concentrate primarily on importation and distribution at the regional level. Otherwise, given the growing demand for medications, they will—in a short period of time—spread out and evolve into monstrous entities. The dispensary pharmacist could thus order supplies from the local cooperative as is done in nearly every country in the world. The result would be improved inventory control and less waste.

Dispensary pharmacists are often faulted for using manufacturer-prepared products rather than having their assistants prepare medicines, but do they have a choice? The few pharmacy assistants—now known as technicians or skilled technicians—are trained primarily for public health institutions. It has become urgent to train more technicians to meet the needs of health sectors and private and public dispensaries and to foster the practice of preparing medications at the dispensary. As Mrs Mhamasdjji points out, "there is no reason for hospitals to continue to purchase such basic products as syrups, powders, and ointments. A mortar, pestle, and some elbow grease are all that is needed."

The presence of pharmaceutical technicians at health care sites is indispensable, says Mr Salah Nebchi, a skilled health technician at the Birtraria hospital, "to help the departments order their supplies in time and ensure good pharmaceuticals management within the departments."

The Costs of Health	
Where Spent	Amount
	(in billions of centimes)
Medicines	160
Care Overseas	120
Health Budget	1,200

### Pilfering and Self-Medication

That is particularly true since pharmacy management within a given department has, up to now, been up to anyone and everyone, resulting in a great deal of waste and in a phenomenon that has grown considerably: pilfering, or more simply put, theft of pharmaceutical products.

Mrs Mhamsadji believes that, "pilfering has become the number-one problem in hospitals. Everyone is guilty of it, from the top physicians to the hospital aide. The only way of controlling it, short of putting an end to it, is to monitor in the treatment department, educate users as to their responsibilities, and to adopt unitary packaging or smaller "blister" type packages so that anyone needing 12 pills, for example, will not have to settle for a bottle of 100, as is often the case now.

Pilfering has become a scourge. Habit and the absence of monitoring and penalties make the temptation seem that much more irresistible. The problem is that there are tens of thousands who give in to it.

In addition to the problem of waste, there is another scourge: prescription drug dependency. Drug supply lines have actually been created inside hospitals where certain administrators, whether inured to the problem, fearful, or simply lax, close their eyes to it. In addition, there is another phenomenon that has grown markedly in recent years: self-medication. In both rural and urban areas, almost every family has a veritable pharmacy in their home. According to Mr Bouzar, "to take your own health, the health of your close relatives and children into your own hands without the supervision of a doctor is an insidious danger to your health and financial resources. The phenomenon is difficult to explain given the increased medical coverage available now that more public and private institutions have been opened. Pharmacists see more and more clients come in search of dangerous drugs without a doctor's prescription, which tends to cause conflicts between the pharmacist who tries to abide by the law and the demanding client."

There is an urgent need for rigorous enforcement of the law governing the sale of medications. Some thirty pharmaceutical inspectors are already setting to work across the country. Other teams will soon join in the effort. One of their tasks is to make certain that medications are never given out without a doctor's prescription.

Why keep a supply of medications at home? We asked that question of mothers who have become "pharmacists" in their own right. They all answered, "if anyone

falls sick at night, particularly the children, finding a 24-hour pharmacy can be a problem...."

There is no question about that. On a daily basis, the list of pharmacies and doctors on call after-hours fails to appear in our newspapers. The green crescent outside of every pharmacy is curiously lit, even when the pharmacy is closed, as called for in the ordinance requiring businesses to have their signs lit at night. In the narrow thinking of some officials, pharmacies are a business like any other. While the glow of a pharmacy's sign means an open pharmacy everywhere else in the world, in Algeria it is a tormenting mirage for the sick. The time has come to take the necessary action.

### International Designations or Brand Names?

But, before a prescription reaches the pharmacist, a doctor must be consulted. If the pharmacist's role is important, the role of the doctor is even more so. A prescription is the equivalent of a blank check. As an indication of the important role of doctors in controlling health costs, there are 30,000 practicing physicians and 30,000 more are training to become doctors, whose primary function is to prescribe medication. They have long been unaware of the range of products available on the market and left to prescribe medicines without the aid of a complete catalog of approved products. As everyone knows, "an unknown product is as good as nonexistent." That, plus frequent changes in brand names due to the diversification of our supply sources and misguided purchases of products that cause side effects or no effect and products marketed for the "underdeveloped regions" leave both doctor and patient with a sense of resignation.

To alleviate these problems, a catalogue of medications approved in Algeria has been published and its 35,000 copies distributed to the country's doctors, pharmacists, and oral surgeons. For the first time, the medical profession has a complete list of what is actually available in Algeria. However, it provides only the international nonproprietary names (INN) of drugs. If the catalog is not to be dismissed by practitioners as was the 1986 "treatment handbook" that was written overseas and distributed without any attribution of authorship, it should be supplemented by a formulary or formularies according to specialization, adapted to the realities of medical practice in Algeria. That is a task for our teachers.

Is it possible to prescribe medicines using the INN? In Mr Bouzar's opinion, "There are several reasons for using the INN in prescriptions: its universal recognition, being one of them. The INN is based on recommendations by the WHO [World Health Organization] and is used in the most scientific writing. It becomes difficult to use, however, when medications contain several active ingredients."

Indeed, while the INN is easy to use for most products because the name is easy to remember and prescribe, for other products the brand name must be used. For

example, the INN for SAIDAL's [expansion unknown] locally produced "Biotgrumes" is Arginine, Betaine, Sorbitol, Inositol.

Because the prescription process involves aural and visual memory, the packaging of medications plays a vital role. Algerian brand names could be created using either the INN or commercial names, as is commonly done elsewhere. For example, Catalgine is known as Catalgix in Belgium. It is difficult to prescribe using the INN that is Sodium Acetylsalicylate, Monosodium Carbonate.

To control spending for medications, the Social Security offices should monitor prescriptions. It is a well-known fact that anyone can write up a prescription and the CNASAT [expansion unknown] reimburses without verifying the name of the prescriber, who could be a medical student (who is not authorized to prescribe), an intern (whose prescriptions fall under the responsibility of the head of department), or even a nurse, since officially stamped prescriptions forms are often left within anyone's reach. The law requires that the prescriber's full name and capacity appear on the form. It is highly recommended that prescribers stamp their prescriptions with this information. The CNASAT should make a computerized list of prescribers and limit reimbursement to legal prescriptions only. It would save the state billions.

#### Indispensable Training

In a letter accompanying the catalog sent to each practitioner, the minister of public health draws prescribers' attention to the national market, which, "thanks to the financial resources allocated by the state and organizational measures enacted by suppliers, should improve and gradually become normal. But normalization depends above all on the your efforts to justify prescription [for medication]. Individually and collectively, the practices followed in prescribing must be assessed to enable us to reach a consensus on the best treatment strategies to follow."

Doctors would like nothing better than to rationalize their prescriptions. But they have yet to be given the information they need. In the field of continuing education, almost nothing has been done for the 20,000 general practitioners in the country. Scientific colloquia have, up to now, been primarily directed at the university hospital practitioner. On leaving medical school, the doctor (like the pharmacist and oral surgeon) was left unaided and often had to make a personal effort to improve his knowledge given the absence of adequate supplemental training and even medical journals.

One of the main weaknesses in our health system is the inadequacy of supplemental professional training. Such training should eventually be made a requirement for all practitioners, generalists and specialists alike. In the developed countries, supplemental training is considered a duty for the practitioner and is systematically supported by governments. Just as for the student,

supplemental training in treatment for the practitioner is the tool by which prescription can be rationalized. The ministers of public health and higher education, along with the CNASAT, should give it their utmost attention, as the credibility of our public health system, not to mention public funds, are at stake in it. Our academics and our people "in the field" should make a close examination of the country's public health problems and organize conferences that will enable us to reach a consensus on treatment guidelines and thereby achieve greater efficiency and productivity.

#### Women's Rights Organization Director Discusses Agenda

45190133b Algiers *REVOLUTION AFRICAINE*  
in French 4 Aug 89 pp 32-33

[Interview with Association for Promotion and Defense of Women's Rights chairwoman Mrs Ourad Akila by Ghania Hammadou: "Intolerance Is the Enemy of Democracy"; date and place not given]

[Text] They have not yet had the last word. The proof: When they are given a chance to speak, the voices of the women burst out, breaking through the wall of silence. This is the third time we have attempted to break through this wall of silence, with this interview with Mrs Ourad Akila, the chairwoman of the Association for the Defense and Promotion of Women's Rights. An association filled with promise; an organization that has become increasingly necessary alongside these new little sisters in the awakening women's movement.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] A number of women's associations—including yours—have been founded in our country these past few months. Each of these organizations intends to assume responsibility for women's many aspirations for emancipation, equality, justice, and advancement. What are your plans, your program, in short, the goals your association is aiming at in the awakening Algerian women's movement today?

[Mrs Ourad] There are actually several organizations in Algeria, including ours: the Association for the Defense and Promotion of Women's Rights. The idea of creating it was born on 8 March 1988, International Women's Day, dedicated that year to solidarity with Palestinian women, the Palestinian people, and "Aouled-El-Hidjara" in their struggle for independence. After their march to the agency representing the PLO in Algiers, the women decided not to wait for 8 March 1989 to meet again. Several meetings were organized bringing together women from different backgrounds (independence fighters, workers, students) to discuss the topic: What kind of organization shall we create and how? An initial examination of the laws conducted by a study group revealed contradictions between the Constitution, the labor code, the SGT [labor code], and their personal status. Information bulletins on discussions organized by these women were prepared as well as meetings that women attended to bear witness to the physical and mental abuse their children had suffered on 5 October,



petitions for film showings, marches in protest against the use of torture, and support for the families of the victims.

Our organization was finally launched on 19 January 1989 in a hostile environment specifically expressed in the difficulties we had in finding a place to meet on the day the Constituent General Assembly was in session.

Our organization's field of interest involves women's social status in the family, the workplace, and the educational system. Its missions are three in number: The first—active information—consists of informing and creating awareness in women with regard to the different laws that affect them, revealing how these laws are not in keeping with women's socioeconomic reality, and demonstrating the negative implications certain provisions of these laws have for women and their children. The second mission, which may be described as one of study and deliberation, aims at compiling case histories with women on various issues such as: divorces, abandonments of family, etc.; these case histories will support our petitions and amendments of the laws. And lastly, our organization sets itself the additional mission of combating any form of discrimination involving women. To achieve this, along with legal experts we intend to organize a counseling and guidance mission for women.

Our immediate program is organized about three poles of action: educational reform, laws governing the family, and women's labor. As concerns reform of the education system, we note that this issue has been secretly "studied" in a climate of intolerable tension and that at no time has mention ever been made of the principle of democratization that we consider to be a principle of social justice by means of which all our people's children can have access to a mandatory, free, quality education. Democratic consideration of this issue must remove it from the sham debate between Arabic speakers and French speakers in which it has been locked up until now and must tackle the essential issues involved in Algerian education, which are still: democratization, quality, teacher training, teaching content, etc. Our organization has publicly stated its position on this reform in a declaration.

The other major concern of our organization is directed toward working women. I imagine you've repeatedly heard those arguments that claim that young people's unemployment is caused by the employment and labor of women. This dangerous and false notion must be combated with all available means. Let's take a look at the real situation! While women occupy 8 percent of the nation's jobs, they represent over 50 percent of the population. Moreover, they are found in either certain specialized positions: at universities, in schools, or the medical corps, where they cannot be replaced by untrained young people, or in maintenance jobs for women—jobs turned down by men. Article 52 stipulates that every citizen has the right to work. For our organization, women's right to work is an inalienable constitutional right. Furthermore, we feel that, to get out of the

economic crisis and underdevelopment, our country has need of the muscles and brains of all its citizens, men and women. Who has an interest in excluding from an active life over half of our population?

Our organization is actively working for a progressive code of laws for the family, that is, a code that is no longer in contradiction with the Constitution, one which establishes women's rights—all of them—protects the family, children, and the wife. A preliminary study of the present code has revealed flagrant contradictions with the Constitution in this document. Our organization is at present working in coordination with a judge and a legal expert on a plan to amend the family code. These amendments apply to the articles dealing with the majority of women, parental authority, polygamy, divorce, marriage, the conjugal domicile, and alimony. Without going into detail, let us say that all of these articles make women perpetual minors incapable of managing their lives and even less so those of these children who are also victims of this legal system.

This sums up the program and the missions of our organization, which is open to all women with no exclusions as long as they stick to its bylaws and our missions. Our organization is not an association of women against men. We are for the defense of the rights embodied in the laws and their extension. For us it is a daily struggle that we do not dissociate from the one engaged in for the development of our country. We demand rights and duties. We demand our place in the society.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] Despite the many organizations, it would appear that a large number of women are still unorganized or at any rate still elude the new cadres established by the women's vanguard: rural women and housewives, who still constitute the bulk of Algeria's women masses. Do you have a program aimed at just these categories?

[Mrs Ouared] Our objective is precisely that: to reach the broad masses of women, namely, housewives, peasants, workers, intellectuals, students, etc.

While we have housewives in our ranks today, the same does not hold true for the peasants. But it's a desire, a need for our organization and we intend to get closer to them little by little through the volunteer health care service. At this point I'd like to remind you that our organization has only been in existence for 6 months and that it hasn't yet acquired national scope and vocation. It's still localized at the wilaya level and we're having enormous difficulties in finding a place where we can provide our services, receive women, meet, in short, conduct all of our activities.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] What, in your opinion, is the significance of organizational pluralism in this women's movement? Isn't there a danger of weakening its effectiveness through this organizational splintering?

[Mrs Ouared] I take advantage of this occasion to extend my greetings on behalf of our organization to the other

women's organizations that have been established in Oran, Constantine, Annaba, and Boumerdes, and throughout the entire countryside, as well as the one founded by our sisters who have emigrated.

It's true that each organization has its specific character, its difference from the others, its particular kind of experience. But the main thing, even with these differences, is still that all of them are fighting for women's rights. At any rate, we hope that one day all of us together will succeed in creating a very democratic organization in which all women workers, intellectuals, students, independence fighters, housewives, and peasants can join forces and fight side by side.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] Can the organization mustered by the three chief associations, the 8 March and 2 July rallies in front of the APN [National Popular Assembly], be viewed as the prelude to an "organizational reunification" or is it merely a tactical rapprochement required because of the urgency and magnitude of the problems women are experiencing?

[Mrs Ouared] Actually, the 8 March rally was generated by an appeal that came from women physicians, independence fighters, workers, students, high-school students, and housewives, and our organization took part in it as a participant in this movement. On that day, after a lecture followed by discussion of the legal and socioprofessional problems women experience, we organized a march with 1,200 women up to the APN to protest the intolerance and violence that women have been the victims of and at the same time to question the government on the need for protecting citizens and applying those provisions of the Constitution relating to individual liberties and security. A delegation of 10 women was received on that day by the head of the government and the president of the APN. We were given assurances that citizens would be protected and that the perpetrators of these attacks would be punished. To date, unfortunately, we haven't noted any improvement of the situation.

As for the 2 July rally, it was in fact jointly organized by the three associations and a group of independence fighters. Its objective was to protest the growing intolerance leveled against young women, specifically in university housing accommodations for young women (Blida, Ben Aknoun, El Alia) and some institutes of higher learning (Dergana), where even their relatives have been roughed up.

On that day we wanted to express our indignation to the appropriate authorities with reference to the crime perpetrated against an innocent 3-year-old in Ouargla, denounce the discriminatory measures applied to young women when taking their exams for the first certificate, and the memo making sports optional for young women.

The president of the republic's speech before the Central Committee, the minister of interior's talk on the radio

program "Transparency," and the Ministry of Education's official denial of the existence of the discriminatory memo on the young women's exams are the first responses to our questions. We would, however, be more reassured if the content of these statements was actually being applied through a greater commitment to democracy and tolerance.

[REVOLUTION AFRICAINE] The activists' dissatisfaction with the answers given could be read on their faces at the last rally in front of the APN. Is this a journalist's interpretation or do you confirm this impression?

[Mrs Ouared] In fact, the delegation received on that day by the vice president of the APN came away without any commitment from that personage, who contented himself with saying to us: "I will convey your concerns." It was only natural for the women assembled in that rally to have left with a legitimate feeling of disillusionment since there had been no response to their expectations and their concerns.

We are, nevertheless, still convinced that it is neither a march nor a rally that is going to solve all our problems, rather that a broad mobilization of public opinion can force a retreat from these regressive practices and this kind of behavior. Because intolerance is the enemy of democracy, we believe that it is through dialogue, discussion, and open debate that we will succeed in finding the best solutions to the problems plaguing our country and our people, starting with Algeria's women.

## ISRAEL

### Deputy Prime Minister on Party Tensions, Menem

44230012B Tel Aviv HADASHOT  
in Hebrew 12 Sep 89 p 23

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Levy by Ron Mivrag; place and date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] If politics is a seasonal matter, September signaled the awakening of the Likud in general—witness the high waves at the end of last week—and David Levy in particular. Levy, who was abroad, including a trip to Carlos Menem's Argentina, returned to the invective meetings of the Likud, to what he calls biting attempts at chaos regarding the Liberals' representatives.

From the sidelines, it seems that Levy's outbursts, both his doctrinal and less doctrinal outbursts, are intended to remind whoever needs reminding that the deputy prime minister must be taken into account. The waves from the "putsch" have still not abated, and Levy has difficulty with meetings between Palestinians from the territories and PLO representatives. He is demanding straight answers from Shamir and Rabin: Are they receiving reports about the meetings?

[HADASHOT] It emerged from the meeting at the end of last week that the established ruling party is still experiencing very serious internal quarrels. Why are you still engaged in such quarrels?

[Levy] The Likud consolidation agreement is based on the apportionment of representation to the two parties. Submitting this to a vote is inconceivable. The Liberals must be allowed to determine their own representation. If they find this difficult, that is their own affair. We are going to do something which is simply contrary to every criteria for honoring the agreement: We are not going to set an agenda, contrary to every normal procedure.

[HADASHOT] Is the nonpublication of an agenda intended to serve someone, to confound someone?

[Levy] This is irregular, because whatever comes suddenly to mind could be brought up for discussion without advance knowledge or preparation; or items could be brought up for discussion based on the number or identity of participants present. Incidentally, many types of examples were brought before the secretariat of how each person wishes to insert his friends and families, and it is really impossible to become reconciled with this from a public standpoint.

[HADASHOT] Can you explain this obstinacy?

[Levy] I can only state that this entire, strange method raises several fundamental questions. Olmert is mistaken if he thinks that I will allow a deal to be made with a certain segment of the Liberal Party. It will never happen, because it would add to his so-called supporters, who would favor him thanks to the fact that he brought them into the center, inasmuch as perhaps they had no other opportunity to enter as active members of the party.

[HADASHOT] Against this background, if it is so, it is very difficult for you to deny that a succession war is being waged at present.

[Levy] It is impossible to say that. On the contrary, if there were a succession war, I would let it develop. However, I said no one would intervene. Let the Liberals determine their own representation. However, Olmert acted as he did.

[HADASHOT] A kidnapping of this sort generally characterizes interparty conflicts in the Knesset, but it is somewhat grating and inappropriate within a single, homogeneous party currently in power. Can you explain what actually brought about such an attempt?

[Levy] I find this grating as well. Which kidnapping do you mean, the first? It indicates a trend, but when you come to correct it, you are accused of brutality.

[HADASHOT] I assume that you find unacceptable the headline of HADASHOT's commentator, which states that there is a strategic alliance to gain control of the Likud during Shamir's term.

[Levy] Not only is it unacceptable to me, I do not want to even treat it. What do I say? Allow the Liberals to determine their own representation according to the agreement. Is there anything more legitimate or natural than that? They say no. They establish a committee and make Olmert its chairman.

[HADASHOT] Regarding your trip to Argentina, did Carlos Menem's peace initiative surprise you?

[Levy] I can only say that, during the visit, I met with government leaders. The meetings were very good. They also pertained to future relations between the two states, and Argentina's position in the international sphere regarding all that concerns Israel. The messages were that Argentina is very interested in strengthening relations between it and Israel in many areas. I was also asked to convey a message to the government that the new government will make great efforts in the framework of coming closer to the United States and the West in general. However, there was no discussion of a specific program.

[HADASHOT] Are you personally willing to hear its details? The new Argentinian leader is of Syrian origin. Should we suspect the sincerity of his intentions?

[Levy] Look, he is an Argentinian citizen. He was elected by the Argentinian people. Argentina is indisputably an important state. If their intention is to strengthen relations with us, we will certainly only encourage that. If Menem has any ideas which are unacceptable to us, we will disassociate ourselves from them as we have done previously with friends.

[HADASHOT] Does it seem to you that the constraints placed on the peace plan resulted in Mubarak's 10-point plan on the one hand and the Menem plan on the other? Have we not actually damaged ourselves?

[Levy] Not in any way. On the contrary. The plan designated the political initiative is supposed to advance the peace process. I opposed it and the government approved it. What is currently happening? Despite our political initiative, which I think goes too far, we are accused of stalemating. Whenever we do not accept an Arab position, we are accused of stalemating.

[HADASHOT] Is it acceptable to you that the initiative is stuck, or that this is demagogic?

[Levy] I am faithful to a process which is coordinated with the United States. It was I who brought the Camp David agreement for approval to the Herut center. I have since been faithful to it. We paid a price, but we know that we have a strong guarantor. What has happened here? We have deviated from this with our initiative. We have brought forth another initiative. America does not see itself violating its commitment. Rather, we released it from Camp David. A situation has been created in which Mubarak's 10 points will provide salvation from the stalemate.



[HADASHOT] How do you explain your timing in raising the issue of meetings between residents of the territories and PLO members abroad?

[Levy] The government has a declared position which is acceptable to all components of the government—rejection of contacts with the PLO. A strange thing is currently happening which requires clarification. People from Judea and Samaria are travelling with approval, meeting with the PLO, returning, meeting with people from our government, and reporting to ministers on the meetings. I want to know, what is the true policy of the State of Israel? Does the State of Israel determine a policy and act contrary to it? Or is it that it does not know what is happening, which is very serious. My problem is not with who is travelling, but with who knows about the trips, approves them, and receives reports on them. If there is an intent to change the government's policy regarding the PLO, please raise this for discussion in the government. However, it is impossible to go to the United States with the argument that it is holding contacts with the PLO while doing the same thing.

[HADASHOT] Did Rabin confirm to you that he is receiving reports?

[Levy] There have been only denials in the meantime. Rabin himself denies. If he approved, that would mean that the denials were a diversion. In any case, it is impossible to operate in an underground, in opposition to the official position of the government.

#### **Georgian Minister Cited on Relations With Israel**

44230024A Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Gid'on Kotz]

[Text] Tbilisi (Special to DAVAR) The Georgian minister responsible for foreign trade, Rafael Alegulshvili [as published], said today that Ari'el Sharon's "The Invitation that Wasn't" affair has impaired the development of relations between Georgia and Israel, and has also deferred the opening of the Israel and Soviet trade bureaus in Moscow and Tel Aviv.

He said that Minister Sharon had not been invited, and that the announcement of his supposed invitation had aroused pressures and protests from the Arab countries. According to him, Georgia cannot invite cabinet ministers who are outright political leaders, such as Prime Minister Shamir and Assistant Prime Minister Peres. On the other hand, Education Minister Yitzhaq Navon will almost certainly be invited to visit Georgia.

However, Minister Alegulshvili said that the economic relations between the two countries will continue. It was learned that talks will soon resume on the opening of the trade bureaus, which apparently will receive the status of delegations and not of representatives.

A delegation of eight Israeli businessmen has arrived in Tbilisi, and they joined the delegation of MK [Knesset

Member] Ephraim Gur, which is already here. The businessmen will look into possibilities of cooperation in fishing, food, and other areas. The minister for foreign trade likened "The Invitation That Wasn't" affair to "a swelling on the hand," and said that time must pass for the swelling to go away.

The minister said that the Government of Georgia had to explain to the central administration in Moscow that the invitation affair had never occurred.

#### **Labor Attitude Toward PLO Talks Reconsidered**

44230012C Tel Aviv DAVAR 12 Sep 89 pp 5, 6

[Commentary by 'Uzi Bar'am]

[Text] In an article in DAVAR (10 September), Simha Dinitz attempted to explain why the "centrist current" has become institutionalized in the Labor Party. Dinitz stated that there are members who feel that their position is not at all being expressed, and they wish to unite to gain support for it. So far so good. However, the name "the centrist current" says nothing about the positions of those belonging to it. Actually, this is nothing but a respectable meeting of members with a hawkish view. When I define them as such, this does not mean that I am placing their position on a par with the position of people on the right. People on the right have a messianic position regarding peace and borders, whereas the position of Labor Party hawks is much more pragmatic and businesslike. However, the name "the centrist current" does not entitle its owners to any centrality, just as the label "Liberal Party" does not impose liberal attitudes on its members, and the so-called "Tehiyah" party is unable to bring about any resurrection, be it national or emotional, but rather the opposite.

It is easy to argue with one who establishes an opposing position. It is difficult to argue with someone who describes your positions with a description which is generalized and invalidated by internal contradictions, and who then disputes what he described. It is understood that a majority in the party can be concentrated against the positions which Simha Dinitz described—a return to the 1967 borders, the surrender of Jerusalem. However, to the best of my knowledge, no significant element in the Labor Party would present such positions. Since I am familiar with Simha Dinitz's sense of humor, I raised an eyebrow when I read his attack on "Force 17," because of the name which, as it were, its members gave it. However, those who gave this name to this assembly of 17 Knesset members are themselves not members of this group. They are its opponents, who wished to deny it legitimacy by means of a name with grave connotations. It should be emphasized that both doves and hawks are counted in this group of Knesset members. Their common denominator is resolute opposition to the establishment of a national Likud government, and a correct view of the difficulties such a government would entail for the state and the Labor movement.

Throughout his article, Simha Dinitz speaks of the "image of the party." In his opinion, only by changing its image will the party succeed in reaching a majority of the people. Only efforts to reach the "center of the political map" will grant us "the public's confidence" so that we will be able to "guide the state toward peace and security."

However, the problem of the Labor Party is not image, but substance. Since 1967, the Labor Party has undergone political changes, all of which are in the dovish or realistic direction. These were not changes in image. They stem from reality. Simha Dinitz and his colleagues fought a rearguard war against any such change, but they became reconciled to it after the fact. Initially, it was said that there is no Palestinian people. Later, it was said that there is a people, but we will not negotiate with it (only with Jordan). Later, it was said that we will give expression to this people, but only municipal. Still later, we became reconciled to negotiations with Palestinian representatives, but only "authentic ones" forming part of a delegation with Jordan. When Jordan slapped us in the face, we said that we favored elections in the territories, provided that people linked with the PLO would not be elected. Subsequently, we said that we would negotiate with any elected representative. Currently, we are saying that not only will we negotiate with those elected, but we will also agree to allow Palestinian representatives not living here to participate in the negotiations.

What do Dinitz and his colleagues want? Do they want people to believe that the Labor Party supports free elections in the territories, but opposes PLO participation in the negotiations? Whoever supports elections must understand that elections require a dialogue with the PLO, with its positions and with its determinations. Anything else would be untenable.

Why, therefore, do Shamir and Arens, who absolutely reject negotiations with the PLO, support the idea of elections in the territories? Because their position, in my estimation, is only a tactic maintained out of image considerations. They profoundly hope that it will be proven publicly that "there is no one to talk with." Not so Labor Party leaders. When they proposed holding elections in the territories, they saw elections as a true means for advancing the peace process. Contrary to the determination of Simha Dinitz, the "doves" unanimously supported the peace initiative. They not only supported it, but argued that exhausting it was so important as not to warrant leaving the government as long as the initiative had a chance. It was clear then, and it is currently seven times clearer, that any idea of elections in the territories is connected to the PLO and requires a gradual change in our position. This will indeed come as a function of the elections process.

The PLO, in its positions and views, is a brazen enemy of the state of Israel, ideologically, politically, and militarily. Our struggle with the PLO will not end quickly. The PLO is nothing but the ideological continuation of the Palestinian movement which existed before the

establishment of the state, and we are involved in a decisive struggle with it. However, the PLO is a national movement, a movement with awareness and an unshakable hold among the residents of Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. The entire world recognizes the PLO. The United States acted correctly when it opened a dialogue with the PLO, because its leaders understood that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be settled without the participation of the sole, accepted representative of the Arab Palestinians. The people see the writing on the wall. The people read that the leaders of Israel maintain that "it is difficult to hold elections in the light of the decision of the Fatah conference." It believes that every Palestinian leader is connected to the PLO and reports his every step to the organization, and it understands that negotiations with representatives from the territories are nothing but negotiations with the PLO's choices in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

The PLO has undergone a significant change in recent years. It is far from being a branch of the Zionist movement, although Likud members would want it so, in which case they would perhaps agree to negotiate with it. The change in the PLO is expressed in its understanding that Israel is an unshakable fact, and that peace means a compromise which must be attained through negotiations. Even Motta Gur said on 28 December 1988: "Contrary to other people in Israel, from all of the parties, who think that the change in the PLO is only tactical, I estimate that the change is true, and I say this happily....The PLO has undergone a serious change. I strongly hope that Israel's response will make it easier for the PLO and all Palestinians to go the way of negotiations." I have no alternative but to support this correct position.

The current debate is over whether or not to extend the prohibition on the PLO. Is there room for a peace initiative, which, according to Dinitz, "favors negotiations with Palestinian residents of the territories," by shaking off the PLO and becoming reconciled to the total prohibition imposed on it by the right under the inspiration of Menahem Begin, who spoke of a "two-legged existence."

Image considerations will not stand up in the face of considerations of essence. The majority of the public in Israel is moderate in its political positions and hard-line in its security positions. It is no surprise that many who favor negotiations with any Palestinian element who recognizes Israel respond with understandable emotion to every murder or terrorist attack. However, emotion must not determine the policy of a responsible movement inclined toward peace. Image considerations are legitimate, but they must not be transformed into the essence of the matter.

The questions which must be answered on the way to determining a political position are: Does Israel have a long-range political and existential alternative without peace? Are our current positions paving the way for the next missed opportunity, over which tears of regret will

perhaps flow in retrospect? Does the road to peace require negotiations with Palestinian residents of the territories? Are negotiations with Palestinian residents of the territories likely without the PLO's consent? Can an agreement be reached with the PLO without developing a dialogue with it?

Such negotiations do not require accepting a Palestinian dictate. In such negotiations, the struggle would be over intermediate agreements, permanent borders, and security arrangements. The road to the Labor Party's comeback to hegemony is a bold struggle over a correct policy which will prevent war, perhaps bring mutual reconciliation, and will restore to Zionism the momentum of immigration and creativity.

### Currents Within Labor Party Discussed

44230012F Tel Aviv DAVAR 10 Sep 89 p 7

[Commentary by Simha Dinitz]

[Text] It has been several days since the headlines heralded "tension," "debate," and even "struggle" between the doves and hawks in the Labor Party. One newspaper went so far as to predict in a sensational headline that "the division is liable to lead to a party split." Why all of this? Because a respected group of members in the Labor Party, "the centrist current," assembled at the party center, decided to institutionalize its meetings, doing what every circle, organization, and group in the party has done for years, justly and rightly, according to the party's constitution and its pluralist, democratic nature.

True, until now, organized groups within the party included mainly dovish groups, whereas groups holding other views were virtually unorganized. True, most of the roles in the party machinery have been and are manned by holders of dovish views, as is the case with the party's spokespersonship and its faction in the Knesset. Consequently, the picture being depicted in the media and among the public is of a party which inclines more and more toward a dovish line. It is certainly legitimate for a broad, representative group of Labor Party members—who believe that the dovish image does not honestly represent a majority in the party, and is damaging the party's ability to restore public confidence in it—to decide to organize itself in the framework of the party and express its opinions.

So far, we have dealt with the rationale for such a group meeting. However, why must such a gathering arouse a storm and quarrels descending to personal defamations unknown in any self-respecting movement? Why do regular, frequent meetings of a "feedback" group for example, or of "Force 17" (whoever conceived this name should be given a prize for public relations and good taste) not arouse controversies or arguments? It seems that the media and the public have become accustomed to these groups and view the meetings of the doves as normal. Perhaps they have begun to think that these groups indeed express the dominant line in the party. If

this is the case, it is certainly important for another voice to be heard. The sounding of this voice is not intended to complain against members who think differently. Rather, it is intended to be an important reminder to the public that the Labor Party is not composed solely of views favoring the Palestinians' right to self-determination, discussions with the PLO, a return to the 1967 borders, and making peace with a Palestinian state. These views represent a minority within a minority, and they have been rejected repeatedly and unequivocally when put to a vote in the institutions of the party.

What then is there to argue or not argue? It has been years since a majority in the Labor Party has been unified behind an agreed-upon political plan and joint strategic course, as is the case at present. It is absurd to divide party members between those more desirous and those less desirous of peace. Likewise, party members cannot be divided according to how they line up behind a political course, whose essence is elections in the territories, whose origin is in the Labor Party, and which has been adopted by the prime minister and the entire government.

As a matter of act, the minority which does not support Israel's peace initiative comprises doves in the party, who argue that refusal to recognize the PLO and to hold discussions with it makes any progress toward elections improbable. However, the decisive majority of Labor members are behind the peace initiative. This majority favors negotiations with Palestinian residents of the territories to advance the political process, absolutely rejects annexation, opposes settlements in densely-populated areas, favors a territorial compromise with secure and recognized borders, and favors Labor's continued participation in the government as long as it is possible to advance the peace initiative.

There is thus no reason to form into groups and quarrel, and certainly no reason for noisy arguing and contentiousness.

The currently prevailing freeze in processes to actualize the political initiative is mainly due to the obstinate position of the PLO and its disgrace at the last Fatah conference in Tunisia. If the United States does not manage to overcome the PLO's recalcitrance, perhaps we will need to examine new political courses. One thing is clear: It would be a political disaster and a disaster for the movement if we begin to blame ourselves for the freeze. The voices demanding that we now propose additional concessions to satisfy the PLO are only strengthening the PLO in its recalcitrance, distancing the possibility of a political solution, and equating our party with an image which it does not have.

Despite all of the differences in nuance and style among Labor Party members, the common denominator in the party is broad and clear. The difference between the Labor approach to a permanent solution and the Likud's approach is also sharp and clear. Also clear and self-understood is the need for members of the party to



struggle jointly to advance their world, political, and social views in the face of their political rivals.

As we approach the internal and external trials facing us, we must stand together, faithful to our principles, as determined in the platform and in the decisions of the party's institutions, without effacing them with the slogans of the dovish left or the dogmatic right. In this way, we will regain our place in the center of the political map and will regain the confidence of the public and the ability to guide the State to peace and security. The Labor Party must regain its place in the center of the political map. Do not blur its platform with the slogans of the dovish left or the dogmatic right.

### **Relations Within, Among Israeli Parties Discussed**

44230012G Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 11 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Eylan Shahuri]

[Text] It is not happenstance that struggles in the Labor Party and the Likud have recently focussed not on subjects related directly to struggles over party leadership, but on hawk-dove disputes and the burning debate over who will appoint 600 additional Liberal representatives to the Likud center. The current appraisal in the two large parties is that, after elections for the Histadrut labor federation, it will be possible to estimate the date for early elections.

Some Labor members are even interested in bringing about the party's departure before Histadrut elections, and they have been behind the recent attempt to renew the political confrontation over the frozen status of the political topic.

It seems that the internal disagreement in the Likud is even sharper. The events in the meeting of the Likud secretariat highlighted the animosity between senior ministers in the movement's leadership, mainly between David Levy and Moshe Arens, and between Yitzhaq Moda'i and Moshe Nisim.

The argument which broke out is apparently marginal: Who has the authority to appoint the 600 additional Liberal representatives to the Likud center. The Likud covenant determines that the Liberals shall have one-third representation in the joint center with the Likud. However, because the party council included only 400 members and the center of the Herut faction has 2,000 members, the Liberals were asked to add another 600 of their members to bring the number of their representatives in the center to 1,000.

However, it emerged that this is not a simple matter. For more than 2 years, the Liberals have been unable to agree among themselves because of internal struggles, at first between Yitzhaq Moda'i and Avraham Sharir, and later between Moda'i and Moshe Nisim. The disagreement has focussed on the key question of the election of

additional representatives. Each of the Liberal ministers has asked to be given the right to add a greater number of people to consolidate his position in the joint Likud center, and to assure his election to the Knesset in the coming elections, based on the assumption that the Liberals would ultimately be engulfed in the joint center with the Herut faction.

The Herut ministers, David Levy, Moshe Arens, and Ari'el Sharon, monitored the struggles among the Liberals with great interest, inasmuch as the addition of 600 members to the Likud center is liable to be decisive in the great contest to succeed Shamir. The division became very clear after cooperation was established between Yitzhaq Moda'i, David Levy, and Ari'el Sharon on the one hand, and between ministers Moshe Nisim, Gid'on Patt, and Moshe Arens on the other. Arens and Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir were interested in Nisim controlling the 600 new members, whereas Levy and Sharon preferred that most of them be supporters of Yitzhaq Moda'i. All of this occurred in demonstrated disregard of the fact that the Likud center is in fact one melting pot, and that power relations are liable to change completely shortly after the merger of the Liberals.

For a long time, Sharon has wooed groups in the Liberal Party, being careful to maintain continuous contact with the Liberals in addition to personal contact with Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i. Arens is attempting to maintain contact with Liberal groups linked with Nisim. The former treasury minister and Gid'on Patt have established a new body designated the "Central Camp," which is composed of people who have left the Liberals. This body has managed to recruit more than 80 percent of the 600 Liberals who are about to join the Likud center. The activity of this body and the fact that Nisim is a confidant of Shamir caused Moda'i to lose his patience last Thursday.

Some argue that Moda'i would prefer the break-up of the Likud to the consolidation of Nisim in the leadership of a unified body. As a matter of fact, Moda'i has every reason to be jealous of Nisim at present. Relations between Moda'i and the prime minister are at their worst.

Before the unification with Likud, Moda'i was considered the leader of the Liberal Party. However, Nisim is currently considered a senior personality among the Liberals. Moda'i is also unwilling to pardon Nisim for giving his consent to the prime minister to relinquish the services of Avraham Sharir in the government in exchange for delivering the tourism portfolio to his confidant, Gid'on Patt. Moda'i claims that Nisim has exerted great pressure on the prime minister in recent months to once and for all conclude the addition of the Liberals to the Likud center. In the struggle now developing in the Likud leadership, the continuous cooperation between the three "rim ministers" should also be remembered. However, it should not be assumed that this cooperation will continue in the long term, because of the conflicting desires and objectives of its members.

Nonetheless, it is a fact that the cohesion between Moda'i, Levy, and Sharon not only pertained to political subjects. Levy's rendering of assistance to Moda'i last Thursday proves that the three are also cooperating in internal organizational matters, which must arouse not a small degree of fear among their rivals in the Likud leadership.

### **IDF Leadership Accuses Press of Souring Public Opinion**

44230002C Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] Recently, I became determined to know how the intifadah has negatively affected the Israel Defense Forces [IDF], and has even dragged the senior officers' cadre into extreme, undemocratic positions. Previously, I had perceived signs of this, but mainly at junior ranks.

I was asked in one of the most important institutions of the IDF to comment on the weight of public opinion in security decisions. This is an important subject in a democratic society such as Israel, stemming, among other things, from questions pertaining to national consensus in times of crisis and public information strategy.

Very quickly, it became clear that the frustration which developed in the IDF following its failure to gain victory over the Palestinian uprising has caused a significant trend towards extremism in the ranks of the senior officers' cadre.

There is great anger toward the media, which, according to many senior officers, has turned international public opinion against Israel and has raised doubts in Israeli public opinion regarding the IDF. The general opinion is that the press not only intentionally distorts events in the field, but is fundamentally corrupt as well, beginning with THE NEW YORK TIMES and ending with newspapers in Israel.

Journalist Yig'al Laviv, who was convicted of extortion, is repeatedly held up as an example in these conversations.

The general opinion—and I have not heard any voice expressing reservations—is that freedom of the press and freedom of expression in Israel must be curtailed—and not exactly for security reasons. The arguments of Israel as a democratic nation are making less and less of an impression.

These views were perceived initially in the first months of the intifadah among soldiers and the junior officers' cadre. In time, the tendency toward extremism also spread to intermediate and senior ranks in the army. This appraisal is indeed becoming generalized, and I found support for it from several senior commanders.

For example, former Central Region Commander 'Amram Mitzna' warned against this phenomenon in his

parting remarks. The outgoing IDF spokesman, Brigadier General Efrayim Lapid, confirms this.

To Lapid's credit, it should be said that he and his people have made a great effort in the past 2 years to explain, within the IDF, the problem of the media in a democratic society. He urged tens of symposiums and discussions in the IDF to stem the deterioration in the IDF's understanding of the topic.

The deterioration did not occur in one day. The press also contributed to it through the spread of the phenomenon of publishing without checking, and disregarding basic rules of etiquette. First they publish, then they check.

After the Lebanon war, it was understood in the IDF that a war not backed by a national consensus is destined to have problems. Interest grew in the IDF as to how the media operates and the best ways to explain Israel's positions regarding vital security matters. The intifadah apparently paralyzed this trend very quickly and caused it to retreat. There are also those who incite the IDF. If, during the Lebanon war, the defense minister at the time, Ari'el Sharon, labeled the press "poison," Prime Minister Yitzhaq Shamir did so in another way. On the eve of last Independence Day, Shamir held a meeting with the general staff. Officers relate that his inciting remarks against the media reached a peak. Don't pay any attention to it, Shamir said.

However, he himself behaved differently when he hastened to the United States with his political initiative. Shamir knew that President Bush had stated in a closed meeting that he, like millions of Americans, is no longer prepared to tolerate the hard television footage of IDF actions against unarmed civilians in the territories.

Shamir understood that he must attempt to divert public opinion, including Jewish public opinion in the United States, and influence it through the media. He attempted to do so, with not a small amount of success during that same visit to the United States.

From the media's standpoint, the intifadah is a different war compared to its predecessors. The difficulty does not stem from its protractedness, for the war of attrition lasted about a year and a half and also posed various public information problems, especially domestically.

The intifadah differs primarily in being a domestic war having elements of a civil war between an army and civilians. Providing explanations in this case is seven times more difficult. This is the main reason why the international media has taken anti-Israeli positions from the very start.

Just as the international media came out against Chinese authorities regarding the demonstrations and the opening of fire against civilians in Peking's main square, so did it take an anti-Israel position when it reported on

the actions of a well armed army against civilians, women, and children—even if they do throw heavy rocks at soldiers.

This war is different from the standpoint of the domestic and foreign media, because the rupture in the national consensus in Israel regarding central security matters is more conspicuous than in the Lebanon war. It has taken not a little time for this substantial difference to be understood by the IDF spokespersonship. But to judge from what is happening in the IDF leadership regarding this subject, the army is not at all prepared for a new contest.

IDF spokesmen find it difficult to convince the military leadership of what it has learned the hard way. In the IDF, they do not understand that the media is used as a new type of artillery in the contests of the late 20th century. Instead of being angry and frustrated, it is better to deploy accordingly.

The IDF must change its classic way of appraising the situation, and it must add the media as an element which must be treated and for which preparations must be made. Just as they deal with the weather, the terrain, and the enemy's weaponry, so too must they deal with the media.

China and the Soviet Union have also recently learned this the hard way. They would currently not allow themselves to do what they did 20 and 10 years ago. The United States learned this poignantly in Vietnam, and after the invasion of Grenada, the investigatory committee reached clear conclusions in this regard, when responsibility was placed on the secretary of defense and the senior command.

In the IDF, the topic is still evaded and treated superficially. The tendency toward extremism in the leadership is of concern from several standpoints. First, such opinions assure us in advance that, in any contest, we will lose not only public opinion, but also the fight. Secondly, this tendency toward extremism is dangerous from a domestic standpoint, because it contains antidemocratic beginnings, which are best treated before they grow.

#### **IDF Presents Long-Term Plan for 1990's**

44230003B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 4 Sep 89 p 13

[Article by Dani Sade: "The Intelligence Systems and Precision Armament Will Take Precedence"]

[Text] Yesterday the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] presented the government with its multiyear program for the next decade based on an intelligence assessment of developments in that period. The main components of the program are: an increase in the IDF order of battle and its types of armament; the level of training and level of preparedness of the forces; equipping the IDF with weaponry; and also the supply issue: ammunition, spare parts, fuel, and food.

Arriving for the government session yesterday morning were the Chief of Staff, Dan Shomron; his deputy, Ehud Barak; the head of the Plans Branch, General Dani Yatom; the head of AMAN [Bureau of Military Intelligence], Gen Amnon Shahaq; as well as commanders of the services and field corps headquarters. After a brief overview by the Defense Minister, the Chief of Staff and his staff officers presented the essentials of the program. They made use of film strips, slides, and handouts. The IDF did not present its monetary requests to the government yesterday, but that will follow.

"The multiyear program will allow us to squeeze the maximum from the available resources, in the proper order of precedence," says a senior military source. "If we don't prepare for the long term, we might get stuck with programs, as happened with the Lavi project."

The program for the 90's puts particular emphasis on the intelligence systems and precision-guided armament. It gives precedence to weaponry with high destructive potential against land targets. The work program is divided into 5-year plans and was updated recently after authorization of the navy's submarine project.

In the area of equipment, the plan includes, among other things, the navy project: two submarines and three model Saar-5 missile ships. The Air Force will get Apache and Blackhawk helicopters as well as other attack helicopters. The plan also sets out the equipment for the ground forces, including giving the armored forces Merkava-3 tanks.

The first 5-year period of the multiyear plan, which already began in April, (the start of the IDF working year), deals with order of battle weaponry, the projects that the IDF intends to carry out, the R and D plans, training methods, manpower plans, construction and deployment infrastructure, and plans for the rear. The second 5-year period, set to conclude in 1997, will include essential plans for building up strength as well as future programs.

"When you draw up the multiyear plan," says a senior officer in the IDF plans branch, "you first estimate the nature of the most serious threat you are likely to face in the coming decade, on the basis of intelligence assessments. You build a program that must preserve the army's readiness to fight a war that could break out any day."

It has been many years now since the IDF last had so detailed a plan. At the beginning of the 80's a multiyear plan was, in fact, drawn up, but was cancelled because of the Lebanon war. Likewise, from 1984 there was a significant erosion in the defense budget, which affected the ability to prepare a detailed plan. In 1986 a 4-year plan was drawn up, in the course of which it was decided to cancel the Lavi project.

Within the IDF plans branch, they say the new plan is modular, so that parts of it can change in accordance with changes that occur in the arena. The methodology is



that after implementation of each annual plan, the IDF will stop and "think a bit." In accordance with that approach, a program has already been drawn up for the year after the first 5-year plan; i.e., a continuation program for the sixth year. Thus the situation arises in which the IDF will always have a program for the next 5 years.

The multiyear work program assures that a situation will not arise in which it will not be implemented. "We have built on budget estimates the frameworks that will be at the disposal of the various bodies in the next decade," a senior officer in the plans branch of the general staff said yesterday. "Today, after we have already started running the work program for the year 1989, which, in fact, is the first year included in the multiyear program, we see that there the two have a lot in common. It is clear that the entire program is built only on what we know today and could change with the outbreak of war, if there should be a political change (for example, peace with Syria), or if there should be a substantive change in the budget."

### Trade Deficit Drops 18 Percent Since January

44230012E Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ  
in Hebrew 11 Sep 89 p 16

[Article by Moshe Rheinfeld]

[Text] Israel's foreign trade figures indicated that the trade deficit has improved since the beginning of the year. From January to August, the deficit totalled \$1.6 billion, 18 percent lower than the same period last year. In this period, net imports totalled \$8.3 billion, which is similar to the import figure for the same period last year. In contradistinction, imports increased in this period by 6 percent to \$6.3 billion.

In August, the trade deficit totalled \$258 million: \$969 million in imports minus \$711 million in exports. In July and August, the deficit, excepting the acquisition of ships, planes, and diamonds, and subtracting seasonal influences, stood at a monthly average of \$124 million, 36 percent less than the average of May and June. This drop in the deficit stemmed from a 6-percent increase in exports and a 4-percent decrease in imports.

These data, reported by the Central Statistics Bureau, do not include trade with the territories. It was also reported that, since the beginning of the year, the deficit, minus seasonal influences, totalled a monthly average of \$208 million, 14 percent lower than the monthly average in the second half of 1988.

Of total imports in August, production inputs, including diamonds and fuel, totalled 76 percent, while investment assets and consumer products each totalled 12 percent. In July and August, imports, excluding ships, planes, and diamonds, decreased by 4 percent compared to the previous 2 months. Since the start of the year, monthly average imports, excluding diamonds, have totalled \$818 million, as in the second half of last year.

Of total exports in August, industrial exports, excluding diamonds, constituted 81 percent, diamond exports constituted 18 percent, and agricultural production constituted 1 percent. Data on deductions for seasonal influences show that in July and August, exports, excluding diamonds, averaged \$670 million per month, 6 percent more than the previous 2 months' average.

### Sharp Increase in Crime Reported in Past Year

44230003D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT  
in Hebrew 5 Sep 89 p 22

[Text] At the end of the summer 1989 an incident can last for a week. A declaration makes the headlines and dies the same day. In a moment of truth this summer, David Kraus told the Knesset that the police, staggering under the burden of the intifadah, has brushed aside its treatment of crime, which he sees as a significant blow to the quality of life, and which "cannot work over the long haul."

The words of the Chief Inspector made the headlines the next day—and were forgotten. Kraus told the Knesset that Israel is abandoning itself to crime. The message didn't get through. The chairman of the Knesset Commission on Legislation, Law, and Jurisprudence, Uri'el Lin, told that to the Knesset and to the public. His message didn't get through either. In the best of circumstances, Lin is portrayed as an activist of the sort beloved by the American right: more law and order, more of a hard hand, the death penalty.

Lin can be ignored. Kraus can be forgotten. But the crime index continues to speak out. The statistics remain. The numbers have no political mark. The victims are Likud and Alignment, CRM [Citizens' Rights Movement] and Tehiya. The victims are increasing at an alarming rate: more Israelis bear the scars of crime, more Israelis die from crime.

Lin pulls out a thick file headlined: "Crime in Israel 1988-1989": Correspondence with the minister of police, parliamentary questions, protocols. Uri'el Lin has the quality of dedication to one thing. He knows that in an indifferent, jaded reality, fanatics have a relative advantage. If you believe in something and don't let go, the system will begin to react, to respond. Reality helps Lin explain himself. The underworld is, in fact, celebrating the intifadah.

Facts: In the period between January and April of this year, more serious crimes (30.7 percent more) were committed than in the corresponding period last year. Violent crimes show an increase of 14.1 percent; lethal crimes, an increase of 172 percent; auto thefts, an increase of 9 percent; drugs, an increase of 57 percent.

A sharp increase was also registered in sex crimes: Rapes, 50 percent more; forced sodomy, 146.3 percent more. There was a slight decrease (between 5 and 10 percent) only in two areas of crime: Breaking and entering and armed robbery.

Lin: "At different times in my life I lived in the United States. What frightens me more than anything else is the possibility that we might deteriorate to a situation in which we would learn to live with crime on an American scale. In fact, we have already adjusted ourselves to living with a 6 percent annual increase in the crime index. Beginning in 1988 a new level of increase was registered, and it is very frightening."

Lin occupies the chair of former MK [Knesset Member] Eli Qols. The Commission on Legislation, Law, and Jurisprudence is becoming a required way station for liberal activists. From there you can go home like Qols, or you can go into the government.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] Do you want to be minister of police in the next government, MK Lin?

Lin smiles as if he heard a good joke, then immediately regains his composure. Political rivals like David Lib'i are ready to confess that Lin is doing an effective job on the committee. Lin believes that he must take things seriously since he already has a contractorship. His portfolio with his new promotion, dealing with crime at this level, speaks for itself. This segment is taking more than a political shot at Bar-Lev.

[Lin] "In the current situation, the minister of police must send a clear message to the government: Either I accept budget cuts, a change in legislation, an increase in manpower, or I walk. If the minister of police does not do this, he teaches us that we must be trained."

Police Minister Hayim Bar-Lev is an easy, fixed target for any claim, but he did not invent the intifadah. These same police forces must now fight on two fronts: Against "Allah Akbar" crimes and against criminals who only want money.

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] The increase in crime, is, perhaps, part of the price to be paid for the war on the intifadah. Uri'el Lin, do you have some remedy that people in the police department have not heard of?

[Lin] "The government must understand that there is a problem, and that understanding must be reflected in the budget. The response that there is no money is unacceptable. By the same token, there has to be a change in understanding the job of the police—more task forces for preventing crime and less focus on investigating crimes that were committed."

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT] How does Chief Inspector Kraus come out in the picture you are trying to paint?

[Lin] "Kraus comes out as a man trying very hard, but he has two problems: a lack of flexibility in his readiness to adopt operational steps like the use of volunteers and the civil guard, and too slow a reading of the situation and too slow a response to change. But it would be unfair for me not to add that I very much appreciate the correct efforts that Kraus is investing."

#### [Box, p 22] Bar-Lev: A Decrease Instead of an Increase

The minister of police, from a protocol of a discussion in the Knesset on the increase in crime, June 1989: "Crime is a social phenomenon. If there are more drug addicts, there are more thieves, more young people with pen-knives who go around stabbing people in arguments—it is a social phenomenon. Anyone who thinks the police alone can stop this, is simply wrong."

"Unfortunately, we are in a situation in which all these phenomena are increasing. Police manpower and budget are not growing linearly with the increase in these problems. The matter has been brought to the attention of the government, the cabinet, the budget committee. The result: in 1989 the police lost 50 policemen and 6 million new Israeli shekels."

#### Particularly Tel Aviv

An analysis of the 1988 data shows, according to Lin, that Tel Aviv is becoming the focus of the sharp increase in crime beyond the relative weight of its population. Says Lin, "In 1988, crime that affects the personal safety of the individual in the Tel Aviv area rose far beyond the national growth rate. Thus, for example, about half of the auto thefts of that year were committed in the neighborhoods of Hayarqon, Ayalon, and Dan."

#### Requesting 1,000 Policemen

The Knesset Interior Committee published its conclusions on the rate of the increase in crime in July 1989. After hearing high-ranking members of the police department, the committee called on the government and the treasury minister "to respond to the police needs for an additional 1,000 policemen and for increasing the budget to allow for the purchase of vehicles and the development of the means and technology to fight crime."

#### UNRWA Activities Examined

44230012A Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR  
in Hebrew 11 Sep 89 p 7

[Commentary by Avner Regev]

[Text] An article published in 'AL-HAMISHMAR 2 weeks ago has apparently expedited a certain political process, which has recently gained momentum and publicity. The article, under the headline "Refugees First," reported full details of a meeting which took place at the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem between the foreign minister, the representative of the coordinator of operations in the territories, and the representatives of seven industrialized states. The meeting occurred amid an attempt by the prime minister and the foreign minister to give impetus to the rehabilitation of the refugee camps, as expressed in the letter sent by the prime minister to the U.S. President in May 1989.

In his response letter, which arrived only recently, President Bush determines that the refugee problem must be

solved in the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian problem. This contrasts with the prime minister's position, which maintains that progress can be made toward solving the refugee problem even if an agreement on elections in the territories is not reached at present.

In his letter, President Bush specifies that the UNRWA [United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East] organization is handling the refugee matter, and that the United States is transferring refugee rehabilitation funds to this agency. It emerges from Bush's letter that the United States does not intend to help the prime minister advance his idea to recruit \$2 billion from the industrialized states for the rehabilitation of the refugee camps.

The prime minister and the foreign minister view the paragraph calling for a solution of the refugee problem, which appears in the framework of the peace initiative, as being equal in importance to the paragraph calling for elections in the territories. The stress of living in the refugee camps is indeed difficult. However, the prime minister and the foreign minister must understand that the refugees currently see themselves as part of the Palestinian people, and consequently, as an integral part of a solution to the Palestinian problem. The refugee problem became part of the overall problem long ago, and it is currently difficult to separate one from the other, despite the desire of the prime minister and the foreign minister.

Nevertheless, the prime minister and the foreign minister make a number of valid arguments in this respect. UNRWA has treated the refugee problem for about 40 years, and it has yet to succeed in moving toward any solution. Also, when the Palestinian problem was not at the heart of the conflict, UNRWA was at pains to maintain the refugee problem. Its activities thus stemmed not only from humanitarian motives, but from political motives and circumstances as well.

Egypt and Jordan, in whose territories the refugee camps were located for many years (until 1967), did nothing to improve conditions in the camps. Nor did they attempt at all to eliminate the camps. UNRWA helped. It did not impede the Arab countries' political aim to maintain the camps as an impetus for any conflict or lack of reconciliation to Israel's existence.

In reacting to Bush's letter, the prime minister stated to his confidants that UNRWA is working in the service of a PLO member. It is not for us to determine if this determination is correct. As an operational arm of the United Nations, UNRWA is financed by UN Member States, mainly by the United States. It is not known whether the PLO provides financing to this agency, which was established in 1950 and is currently headquartered in Vienna. UNRWA's goal upon its establishment was to rehabilitate refugees in their places of residence. It has not succeeded in advancing this mandate, having become involved instead in three activity areas: Food

distribution, responsibility for education in the refugee camps, and concern for the health of residents of the camps. The agency currently employs about 17,000 persons in the Arab countries and the territories. Several thousand are employed in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza.

The PLO arose amid the distress in the camps and saw itself as the representative of the refugees and their demand to return to their places of residence in Israel. Thus, the ideological basis for the existence of the PLO is the refugee problem. From here, the way is short to connecting the PLO's activities with those of UNRWA, which maintains the refugees' distress. This logic explains the prime minister's remarks.

Recently, UNRWA's activity has undergone a significant and dangerous change. Since the outbreak of the intifadah, many signs testify to an expansion of UNRWA's purview. Instead of handling refugee camps exclusively, it is currently treating all Palestinian residents, without distinction. This trend is contrary to the purpose of the mandate given to UNRWA upon its establishment. In January 1989, elements of the administration began to discern that "the agency began to expand its health activities, treating people injured in the intifadah, who are not residents of the refugee camps."

On 30 August of this year, the East Jerusalem AL-SHA'B newspaper published a photograph of UNRWA vehicles, bearing the UN symbol, visiting the village of al-'Azariyah in Judaea during a curfew. The photograph of the vehicle, which was helping to locate injured, is proof of UNRWA activities among residents who are not refugees. Senior elements in the administration determined subsequently that "a change in the profile of the activity of UNRWA exists in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza." The Red Cross also recently complained to the UNRWA administration that its personnel are treating Palestinians who are not residents of the refugee camps.

In these and other examples, UNRWA has become, according to senior political sources, an element which is acting against Israel within the scope of the intifadah. These sources expressed fear that, with the approach of the General Assembly soon to be convened in New York, UNRWA personnel will attempt to extend their mandated activity in the area to include all residents, not just those of the refugee camps.

Interestingly, UNRWA has also operated in Arab states populated with refugees, such as Jordan and Syria, where it is forbidden to deviate from its mandate, and where it does not dare to participate in any political struggle.

UNRWA has recently been distributing certificates to residents in the territories, who, in its opinion, require its aid, without considering their origin and their place of residence. It should be explained that UNRWA, in the years following the Lebanon war, changed its criteria for providing food and medical aid, claiming that many refugees had become integrated in their places of residence and no longer required assistance. Thus, UNRWA determined that only the needy in Judaea, Samaria, and



Gaza, can be treated, and it acted accordingly. However, with the outbreak of the intifadah, the agency changed its policy and returned to massive treatment of all the residents in these areas, as expressed in the distribution of entitlement certificates. This activity deviates from the mandate granted to UNRWA upon its establishment in 1950.

Bush's letter, and its determination that treatment of refugees falls within UNRWA's area of responsibility, has posed a serious problem to the Israeli Government. A fierce debate exists currently inside the government over how to respond to Bush's letter. On the one hand, there is no desire to clash with the U.S. administration, certainly not with the White House. On the other hand, inasmuch as President Bush has elevated UNRWA as an executive apparatus, and inasmuch as senior government officials believe UNRWA is hostile toward Israel, the organization's activities should be openly opposed, and an effort should be made to expose the activities in which it engages contrary to its operational mandate, even at the price of losing some support in Washington.

According to government elements, President Bush is probably comfortable with UNRWA activity at present, because it allows the Americans a certain amount of control—through U.S. financial support—over the Palestinian entity forming in the territories. For this same reason, personalities in the government oppose the possibility of changing UNRWA's mandate, if and when a request to do so is brought up in the approaching General Assembly.

The prime minister sees the road to a breakthrough and progress toward elections in the territories under two

central headings in the peace initiative. One is a solution to the refugee problem, and the other is an end to the state of war on the part of the Arab states. The prime minister believes that progress under these two headings will provide proof of a willingness and desire for peace, and will make possible the creation of an atmosphere for holding elections in the territories. He believes that an agreement with the Palestinians alone will not end the state of war, maintaining that only states make wars, whereas terror organizations can only make trouble. Bush's response, in which he does not refer directly to these topics and places responsibility on UNRWA, is, according to those close to the prime minister, only evading a serious attempt at a solution. That being the case, the President's letter disappointed Israeli policymakers.

The peace initiative, which has returned to the headlines, and which includes the refugee problem, is one, integral piece. The prime minister and the foreign minister are correct in their determination that it is necessary to treat the refugee problem and prevent UNRWA from acting against Israel. However, they must accept the fact that an attempt to push aside elections in the territories in order to first solve the refugee problem and end the state of war will not succeed. The United States views elections in the territories as the essence of the peace initiative. Policymakers in Jerusalem would do well to adjust themselves to that. Elections in the territories will result in a willingness to solve the refugee problem. Then the government will be able to request Western help to rehabilitate the refugees. The Israeli peace initiative, including all of its paragraphs, is the basis for any political progress in the region.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**'Sources' See Tehran Seminar on Afghanistan as Failure**

45000044 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 16 Oct 89 p 5

[Text] AL-DUSTUR's sources in the Iranian capital have described the meetings which took place in Tehran, with the participation of the sides embroiled in the the Afghanistan issue under the cover of the international seminar on Afghanistan, as a failure and said that they had not achieved what Tehran had hoped for them.

The sources indicated that, among the mujahidin leadership in Pakistan, no one attended the meetings except Burhaneddin Rabbani and Sebghatullah Mojaddedi, who had opposed the Iranian plan to establish a coalition government in Afghanistan with the participation of Najibullah's government. They also showed extreme discomfort with the attempts of Iranian officials to change the seminar into a stage for attacking Saudi Arabia and its role in Afghanistan.

## AFGHANISTAN

**U.S., Pakistan Reappraise Afghanistan Policy**46000035B Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 5 Oct 89 p 4

[Article by Khalid Akhtar: "Afghanistan: A Change of Script Underway?"]

[Text] The long awaited reappraisal of the Afghan policy on the part of the US and Pakistan is finally underway. The first signal of the change came during Benazir Bhutto's visit to the United States this year. Since then the two countries have slowly but surely retracted from their "no business with PDPA [People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan]" position.

With the pro-Mujahideen lobby exercising substantial influence both in Capitol Hill and Islamabad it was understandable that any shift by the two states on the Afghan issue had to be gradual and made acceptable to the "die hard." In Pakistan's case it was Gen. Aslam Beg, Chief of Army Staff, who, during the course of his Sept. 13 GHQ briefing, said dialogue should be initiated with the PDPA, provided Najib steps down. The general had solved Bhutto's dilemma—she would have faced a political uproar if she had made this announcement.

**US Policy**

The US climbdown has been systematic. The gauntlet was thrown at the Mujahideen who were asked to break the "no-loss no-win" stalemate at the war front if they wanted America to play a meaningful role to help them achieve power in Kabul. The review of the US Afghan policy was postponed until the outcome of the summer fighting in Afghanistan. But the 1989 summer turned out to be the most frustrating for the Mujahideen. They

could not launch any offensive worth the name. Finally their ranks were subverted by the Najib regime, which as the summer drew to a close, looked more secure than ever. The onus of failure was clearly on the Mujahideen. Earlier Edmund McWilliam, in charge of the Afghan desk in the US embassy in Islamabad, was packed home for hampering arms supplies to the Mujahideen and for holding different views on possible approaches to the Afghan settlement. He was apparently made a scapegoat for the otherwise deliberate and well calculated shift in the US policy on the Afghan imbroglio.

The contact between a US diplomat and former King Zahir Shah in Rome last month has been the strongest indication to-date that the US no longer pins high hopes on the Afghan Interim Government and that possibly it has come to share the Soviet view that an acceptable and durable government could be built in Afghanistan around the exiled monarch.

Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, after a 10-day stay in Pakistan during which he met both Pakistan officials and Mujahideen leaders, on his return to the US has called for an accord on negative symmetry (something which the Soviet Union has been pressing for), and suggested setting up a neutral government under King Zahir Shah in Afghanistan for the purpose of holding general elections. It is evident along which lines the reappraisal of the US Afghan policy is taking shape. The pro-Afghan lobby at Capitol Hill has found too little at its disposal to turn the tide.

It is difficult to say whether Pakistan has coordinated its moves with the United States, though the evidence would suggest in the affirmative. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, a Senior Minister in Bhutto's Cabinet, attended the Afghan National Day function at the Afghan Consulate in Karachi in August. Since the beginning of the Afghan imbroglio this was the first time that a senior state functionary had attended any Afghan function. Recently a Pakistani delegation under I. Imam, Cultural Adviser to Begum Bhutto, visited Kabul and reportedly held talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Kabul regime. These developments cannot be viewed in isolation with the steadily creeping change in the US Afghan policy.

In her latest interview with the BBC, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, while carefully avoiding reference to direct talks with the PDPA regime in Kabul, stressed upon the Mujahideen to find a negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue. "We have been pushing the idea of a political settlement," she said, but added that all the parties in the IUAM [Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahidin] had adopted a tough attitude. It should be noted that the call for a "negotiated settlement" carries an implicit recognition of the necessity for all the parties in the conflict to open a channel of negotiations with each other. Benazir Bhutto has said in diplomatic jargon what Gen. Aslam Beg said so bluntly.

### Divergence

A significant point of divergence appears to be emerging between the United States and Pakistan. The COAS [Chief of Army Staff] in his Sept. 13 briefing outrightly rejected the Zahir Shah option. Though Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan has met the exiled monarch once or twice in Rome, serious reservations have continued to be expressed in Islamabad about the deposed monarch. Benazir Bhutto, who has moved very carefully and cautiously on the Afghan front, has given no hint of what she thinks about the Zahir Shah option. But the US is apparently seriously exploring the possibility of playing the "Zahir Shah card." How the two countries reconcile their positions or which one of them makes an adjustment in its stand remains to be seen.

Then there is the intricate question of deciding the modalities of putting the peace talks on the rails. The Soviet Union has put forth the proposal of thrashing out the issue at a world conference which would be attended among others by India. Both the Soviet Union and the Najib regime have supported India's role in the Afghan settlement—something which is least acceptable to Islamabad.

Lately the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, has proposed a regional conference, consisting of countries situated around Afghanistan and all Afghan groups, clearly implying and advocating for the PDPA participation. However, he has ruled out any role for the US, India and Saudi Arabia.

An equally significant point of divergence has developed in the position of Pakistan and Iran. It is difficult to imagine that Islamabad will endorse any peace conference that does not ensure, either directly or indirectly, the participation of the United States. Neither will the United States allow itself to be totally removed from the Afghan scene, where it has spent millions of dollars. It will view any such move with suspicion and apprehension. However, Iran seems to be better placed than Pakistan vis-a-vis the Afghan crisis. Tehran's very close collaboration and understanding with the Eight Party Alliance has contrasted sharply with Islamabad's difference-ridden relations with IUAM. In the existing situation this could give Iran a decisive edge in the peace negotiations.

Despite moves on various fronts, there is still a long way to go before the Afghan problem is resolved and the Afghan agony is brought to an end. The one great hope is that all the parties to the conflict have expressed their faith in and urged a greater UN role. Shevardnadze and Yaqub Khan after their recent meeting, which the latter described as useful, in New York expressed similar sentiments. Some circles in Islamabad believe that the Soviet Union will ditch Najib to meet Pakistan's main demand to pave the way for a political solution of the crisis. Gen. Aslam Beg expressed such optimism during his briefing. However, the irony is that the peace efforts

have found the Mujahideen ill-prepared. It is time for them to look beyond Najib and PDPA.

### Return of Zahir Shah Debated

46000035A Peshawar THE FRONTIER POST  
in English 16 Sep 89 p 6

[Editorial: "Can Zahir Shah Come Back?"]

[Text] Pir Gilani, a member of the Afghan interim government (AIG), has said in Islamabad that the people of Afghanistan would welcome the return of the ex-king Zahir Shah provided a truly elected shoora were to decide the matter instead of the current "nominated" one. Pir Gilani's own status within the AIG has been determined by the shoora he doesn't like, but one supposes that when he talks about Zahir Shah he puts on his Islamic front cap and not that of the chief justice in the AIG. Given the disorder inside the AIG, it is likely that the Pir is reviving the theme that used to cause so much confusion in Peshawar in past years. He has never been alone in his position on the old ex-king. The moderate mujahideen were always with him. Things may have changed a bit but the AIG President Mujaddadi, heading the third largest mujahideen formation and a saint like Gilani, retains his pro-Zahir Shah stand. Mohammadi, whose Harkat was eclipsed because of its decreasing ability to procure arms for its people at the same rate as Hekmatyar, could have toned down his earlier support but one may be sure that given an opportunity he would also plump for the ex-king.

Faced with the chaos of leadership in Afghanistan, actors on the stage of war have off and on considered what is called the "Zahir Shah option" vis-a-vis the mujahideen groups, who want no one to break the deadlock. It has also been the "Zahir Shah card," purported to be played at different times by the U.S., the Soviet Union and even India. In Pakistan, where some people think Zahir Shah would be against Pakistan's interests, the "option" is opposed on the basis of the rather "romantic" notion that the mujahideen would be "pro-Pakistan" after coming to power in Afghanistan. The chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, is opposed to the Zahir Shah "option" on the ground that bringing him back would be an "external" act, violating the principle that Afghans should decide whom they want. Clearly, the message is that the recent American contact with Zahir Shah in Rome was not the right thing to do. Whether or not it was right, it has led directly to the mujahideen talking about the ex-king again.

The question of Zahir Shah is going to cause divisions without bringing near the solution in Afghanistan. Neither the Jamiat, the largest mujahideen outfit headed by Prof. Rabbani, nor the Hezb, the second largest outfit headed by Engineer Hekmatyar, wants any truck with Zahir Shah. If these two mutually opposed groups are united over the question, no one can play the Zahir Shah card without turning the resistance on to himself. Pir Gilani hopes that the shoora, which formed the AIG, would somehow be nullified by what has happened in



recent months, and a new, more representative, shoora, would be brought into being to accept the consensus figure of Zahir Shah even if the mujahideen don't like him. He is hinting strongly at the shoora's bias in the inequitable appointments in the AIG cabinet and its failure to satisfy the mujahideen in Iran. It is difficult for anyone unfamiliar with Afghan sociology to understand the total lack of accommodation in the positions of the various Afghan leaders.

What should be the next step in this welter of conflicting positions? Much cynicism has been expressed about the "drift" in the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government, but one has to cast a look at the political landscape of Pakistan to understand why this "drift" is quite natural. The opposition in the Punjab has played up the Indian theme against the government till the campaign has reached farcical proportions. The mujahideen are more firmly entrenched in Pakistan and have more liaison with political elements here than most of us can imagine. General Mirza may have the guts to propose a Soviet-mujahideen dialogue when the mujahideen have rejected it, the PPP government cannot do it. Although we have been told that Moscow is ready to ditch Najibullah, the mujahideen will have to make concessions in the face of the reversals they have suffered at the hands of the PDPA and the shameful lack of unity that has compounded their perennial inability to evolve a non-military political strategy in a post withdrawal Afghanistan. The U.N. has to be called in again to test the waters of a divided Afghanistan simply because no one party is able to communicate with all the actors on the stage of Afghanistan today.

## INDIA

### Commentary Views Effect of Bofors on Elections

90OI0010A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA  
in Bengali 16 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Sunit Ghosh titled "The Smell of the Bofors Gunpowder Will Not Let the Prime Minister Rest Until Elections"]

[Text] On 11 September, Ram Jethmalani's Bharat Mukti Morcha released 1,000 balloons from a place near the India Gate in the capital. On each balloon was printed a couplet: "Brother Rajiv, Brother Rajiv, who has gobbled up the kickbacks of the gun-deal?" If a person collects one of these balloons, goes to the Delhi office of the Morcha with the specimen, and expresses his opinion on the Bofors gun-deal kickback, he will be given a 100-rupee note. Throughout the week, 1,000 balloons will be released every day.

Jethmalani will hardly have any equal in doing things bizarre. How effective this balloon project will be in freeing the common people from the influence of the relentless lies being spread, through radio and television, by the central government in order to hush up the Bofors kickback scandal is a difficult conjecture. What emerges

from this is that the smell of the Bofors gunpowder will not allow Rajiv Gandhi a peaceful slumber up to the coming election. After the resignation of the opposition members of parliament during the last session of the Lok Sabha, and after the superficial discussion on the Comptroller and Auditor General's [CAG] report, the Congress camp seemed to be complacent, as if the worst had come to the worst and there was nothing to worry about. At this juncture, the former Army Chief Sunderji exploded another bombshell. This bomb was deadlier than that of the CAG. The CAG report helped the seeding of a strong doubt in the people's mind about the quality and kickbacks concerning the Bofors guns. Sunderji's statements proved those doubts to be true.

The questions concerning the Bofors gun controversy which have rocked the country are: 1) Whether this gun is the best of its kind qualitatively; 2) How 640 million rupees have been given as kickbacks in spite of the agreement between the late Swedish premier Olof Palme and Rajiv Gandhi that no middleman should be employed for the deal; 3) Who has bagged this money?, and 4) Whether it was that difficult to make the Bofors company reveal the middleman's name or compel the Bofors company to return the kickback amount on the plea that they broke the agreement. There was no scope of disagreement on the first question. Experts more or less agree that the Bofors gun is the best of its kind. However, the CAG raised some questions about the selection procedure of this gun. Efforts to get an answer to the second question stirred up the actual controversy. From the very beginning of the controversy, Mr Rajiv Gandhi maintained that as per the agreement between him and Olof Palme there should not be any middleman. Accepting the prime minister's words as the gospel truth, nobody asked at that time why the agreement was unwritten. When the Bofors company said that they did not know the existence of any such agreement, Rajiv Gandhi vociferously said, "There was an agreement". That claim was proved wrong by the CAG report. It was clearly stated in the report that there was no written agreement not to employ any middleman. That means a gap was retained regarding the brokerage on the gun deal. The CAG did not comment whether it was deliberate or not.

When it was ascertained that kickbacks had been paid, it was told by the government that no Indian had taken the payment. Rajiv Gandhi jokingly said: "No member of my family has taken any commission." But that did not bring the issue to a close. It was demanded that Bofors should be asked to reveal the names of the middleman and return the kickback amount. Otherwise, the agreement would be annulled. The then minister of state for defense, Mr Arun Singh, himself proposed this. But at that time it was not known that Arun Singh's proposal was virtually the suggestion of the Army Chief Sunderji, i.e., the suggestion of the Army. Uptill now this fact remained a secret. After the resignation of Arun Singh and the retirement of Sunderji, the ruling circle almost

took it for granted that no further question would be raised on this, but Sunderji brought the dirty linen out in the public.

Sunderji was a close confidant of the central rulers. This ambitious soldier was always ready to please them. Sunderji played the most vital role in the 'Bluestar Operation' at the Golden Temple in Amritsar as per the directives of Indira Gandhi. In a sense, he led the attack as the commander of the Western Army division. He received both recognition and rewards from this. He superseded quite a few to be placed at the highest post in the Army in 1985. This handsome, ready-witted and eloquent general was nicknamed "Garry Cooper" by his colleagues. Sunderji had good rapport with Rajiv and his computer-boys because he, too, was absorbed in his colorful dreams for the 21st century and modernisation of the army.

Nobody believed that such a person as Sunderji would suddenly bring the cat out of the bag to hit at the very root of Rajiv Gandhi's fictitious honesty. Every time the Opposition members tried to raise their doubts about the quality of the Bofors gun, the Government played Sunderji card saying, "Do you know better than the Army Chief?" But the fact that Sunderji had proposed to put pressure on the Bofors with the threat of annulling the agreement was always kept a secret. Now it was proved that Arun Singh and Sunderji had proposed to annul the contract in the interest of the country's prestige. According to Sunderji, Bofors would have bowed to the threat of annulling the contract and revealed the names of the middlemen and other information, because they wouldn't have taken the risk of losing the 1427-million rupee contract. Under this pressure, the Bofors company agreed to send a team to Delhi to freely discuss all the issues. But it was Rajiv Gandhi who put his foot down. After returning from a Moscow trip on 4 July 1987, the prime minister called a high level meeting with Arun Singh, additional defense secretary N. N. Vohra and others and reprimanded them that they had done what they were specifically told not to do, saying when the joint parliamentary committee was looking after the matter, the Bofors team should not come to India.

These are all part of history now. It is now clear after the statement of Sunderji that Rajiv knows who has taken the kickback, but he does not want to reveal the name of the middleman. The argument that annulling the contract would jeopardise the country's defense is now useless because the Army Chief holds a different opinion on this. The dangerous consequence of political decisions on defense matters was demonstrated when in 1962 Jawaharlal Nehru sent the unprepared soldiers to the icy-cold NEFA [Northeast Frontier Agency] region to fight the Chinese troops armed with modern weapons. This time, too, Rajiv Rajiv has sacrificed the country's prestige in front of the Bofors gun by his political decision. But will the truth remain unrevealed?

## IRAN

### New Coupons Issued for Kerosene, Sugar

90OI0023A Tehran ETTELA'AT  
in Persian 12 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] Economic service—New ration coupons for sugar cubes and sugar were issued for our compatriots.

According to the public relations office of the national economic mobilization headquarters, coupons Nos 122 Urban and 22 Rural of the 8th phase series of coupons for essential goods were allocated for sugar cubes and sugar at 1,200 grams per person.

The 122 Urban coupons will initially be valid until 20/10/68 [31 December 1989] and sales agents will have until 5/11/68 [25 January 1990] to redeem the coupons in Tehran at the branches of Saderat Bank and in the provincial cities at the branches of the Provincial Bank.

It should be explained that the price of each individual coupon for sugar cubes and sugar rations is 33 rials.

### Announcement of New Kerosene Coupons

Economic service—All kerosene consumers in Tehran, Karaj, and the suburbs are hereby informed that kerosene coupons No 154 in the amount of 60 liters and extra coupon Nos 9 and 10 for large families at 40 liters apiece are valid from 21/6/68 [12 September 1989] through 2/8/68 [24 October 1989].

The public relations office of the National Petroleum Products Distribution Company also announced: Non-domestic industrial production coupon No 15 is valid through 2/7/68 [24 September 1989].

### New Dam To Be Constructed in Mashhad

90OI0023B Tehran ETTELA'AT  
in Persian 9 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] Mashhad—Simultaneous with the birthday of the seventh leader of the Shi'ites, in the presence of the ministers of the construction jihad and education and training, the construction operations of the first earthen redirecting Khur Dam, located in the Kalat watershed of Mashhad, began.

This dam, which will have a capacity of 70,000 cubic meters, will provide the water necessary for 130 hectares of orchards in the 3 villages of Khur Kalat in spring and summer.

According to IRNA [Islamic Republic News Agency]: The cost of this project has been estimated at 57 million rials, of which 50 million rials will be provided from the funds of the water committee of the Khorasan jihad and the remainder by the inhabitants of the villages mentioned.

It is noteworthy that annually 500 million cubic meters of water run off towards the north from the vast Khur

Kalat watershed, but with the construction of this dam, the waste of some of the water from precipitation and floods in an area of 26 square km will be prevented.

## PAKISTAN

### Lahore-Islamabad Confrontation Subject of Commentary

46000031C *Islamabad THE MUSLIM*  
in English 26 Sep 89 p 4

[Commentary by Mir Jamil-Ur-Rahman: "Pepsi Cola and Frico Milk"]

[Text] The Federal government has always maintained that there was no confrontation between Punjab and the Centre. The confrontation, it has explained time and again, is between the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad] and the PPP [Pakistan People's Party]. The position appears to have changed now. The Ministry of Interior has charged the Punjab government of a long list of infractions ranging from rebellion to subverting the Constitution.

#### Indictment

The indictment is formidable. The Punjab government is charged of: 1) "rebellion" for arresting two FIA [Federal Investigation Agency] officials; 2) "attack on the Federation" for (a) blocking of railway tracks by workers of the Ittefaq Foundry and (b) instituting a "false murder case" against a Federal Minister; 3) "subverting the Constitution" by publishing "false and fabricated advertisements" concerning Frico milk powder; 4) "sedition" for starting a pamphlet campaign against the Federal government; 5) harboring known criminals and absconders; and 6) issuing frequent threats to throw out all Federal government employees. In addition, the Punjab Chief Minister has been directly charged of making "unilateral declaration of independence" in the most vulgar and obscene language. There is a solitary charge against IJI for making statements inviting the Army.

That is not all. The new Minister of State for Information, Malik Ahmed Saeed Awan, has added to the indictment count. He claims that maligning of Zardari family constitutes "clear-cut rebellion" against the Federal government. Spending millions of rupees on advertising that Ittefaq Foundry has been denied railway wagons to transport its scrap, and registering "bogus" cases against the PPP leaders are also manifestations of "clear-cut rebellion." Mr Awan believes that the Punjab Assembly may have to be dissolved and governor's rule imposed in the province to crush the rebellion. The Central Information Secretary of the PPP, Mr Qayyum Nizami, has suggested a milder remedy. He is for moving a reference in the Supreme Court against Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif and the Punjab government for revolting

against the Centre. He has also questioned the "meaningful silence" of the President of Pakistan in this matter and has asked him to play his constitutional role to save democracy.

On the other hand, the Special Assistant to PM on Establishment, Rao Rasheed, has spotted neither a rebellion nor a revolt. He has only noticed that Punjab Chief Minister was "sabotaging" the democratic process. He has ruled out retaliation by the Federal government till the Chief Minister crossed the last limit.

"Rebellion" is a dangerous word and ought to be used with care. It means armed resistance on a large scale against the government. Rebellions are often doomed to failure. A rebellion, if successful, may become a full-scale revolution which implies the overthrow and replacement of a government or a political system by the people. The arrest of two FIA officials by the Punjab Police may have been an unwise act, but it could not be termed as rebellious. Whether the Punjab Police was acting illegally and beyond its authority, only the law can tell. If the court is to find the act mala fide and illegal, the perpetrators must be punished according to law. Maligning a person or using obscene language might be a culpable act under the law of defamation, but not rebellion by any stretch of imagination.

Registration of a case, whether true or false, against a Federal Minister or a PPP leader could not amount to an attack on the Federal government. Let the court of law decide the veracity of the accusation. If the accusation is found false, the accuser must be dealt with severely and the accused compensated adequately. The Federal government has so far not released enough information about the seditious pamphlet. Until its contents are known, any comment would be frivolous. It is normal practice to register protests through paid advertisements. The advertiser, and the newspaper which carries the advertisement, could be sued for slander or accused of lying depending on the text of the advertisement. But it cannot be labelled as subversion of Constitution. Attack on the Federal government is not an offense. Leaders of public opinion are frequently attacking the Federal government on one issue or the other.

#### Farcical

The Lahore-Islamabad confrontation has now reached farcical proportions. It would not serve any purpose to blame one or the other. Both are equally responsible for getting themselves to the edge of the precipice. People are genuinely concerned about the future of democracy. The only optimistic and hopeful note has been sounded by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan. He told the press on September 23 that he was doing his best to bring an end to the confrontation. He assured the pressmen that his efforts would be successful.

In their fruitless political battle the two governments have started embroiling the civil service. It is a ridiculous spectacle to watch a civil servant nervously justifying government action on the TV screen. This practice



is unprecedented and superfluous. Politicians should fight their own battles and leave the civil service alone. The Federal government has placed the four Federal officers in a very awkward position by recalling them from Lahore without first consulting the provincial government. The Federal government has threatened the officers with disciplinary action if they did not report to Islamabad within a specified time. On the other hand, the officers face disciplinary action from the Punjab government if they were to leave without its consent. The four harassed officers have now moved the court to resolve their predicament.

It is not easy to determine who is acting more foolishly: the Federal or the Punjab government? Both are desperately trying to surpass each other in proving that they are either incapable or disinterested in governing the country. Their only concern is to settle old scores. They have no time to attend to the grave problems of unemployment, inflation and law and order. The problems may have to wait till eternity but the combatants must first have their pound of flesh. The government has become a joke and is losing public respect at a terrible speed. It is a great pity that the destiny of a 110-million-strong nation has been made incidental to the fate of American Pepsi Cola, Dutch Frico milk powder and Ittefaq Foundry.

#### **New Strategy Planned To Attract Foreign Investments**

46000034A Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 24 Sep 89 p 8

[Text] Karachi, Sept. 23—Pakistan is evolving a new strategy for attracting foreign investment and for the transfer of technology and a new policy package will be announced within a month or two.

The policy is expected to open up the export sector to foreign investment now almost exclusively being handled by Pakistani nationals and public corporations.

A broad hint to this effect was given by Federal Minister for Commerce Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat who observed that a major instrument for export could be foreign investment which could help in the import of modern machinery and transfer of technology.

He was inaugurating a seminar on "Pakistan Trade Policy and Export Strategy" organised by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Karachi.

He told the business community that "we are in the process of coming out with new measures and new incentives for foreign investment." He said the government was trying to create a congenial climate for foreign investment by removing the bottlenecks. It was now studying measures needed for encouraging foreign investment.

He expressed the hope that the seminar, which was most timely, would present innovative and creative ideas and

specific plans for improving the export strategy and reducing the export-import gap.

Replying to the address of welcome by the Chamber President Mohammad Yunus Bandukda the Commerce Minister said the cost of production was going up throughout the world and the only alternative for Pakistan was to acquire modern technology to improve industrial efficiency. He added that the government was therefore laying great emphasis on the transfer of technology and, for this, wanted to encourage foreign investment.

Earlier in an address of welcome Mr. Bandukda highlighted the main characteristics of the foreign trade, the problems facing the business community and the fact that no headway had been made in the diversification of trade either commoditywise or countrywise.

He said there existed a wide import-export gap. Exports financed about 70 percent of Pakistan's imports and the export-base continued to be thin.

Only 10 items were depended upon for exports. Exports comprised 30 percent primary commodities, 15 percent semi-manufactured and 55 percent manufactured goods. He said imports consisted of 35 percent capital goods, seven percent raw materials for capital goods and 43 percent raw material for consumer goods and 15 percent consumer goods.

#### **Qaumi Inquilabi Party Announces Four-Point Program**

46000032C Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 24 Sep 89 p 4

[Text] The recent formation of the Qaumi Inquilabi Party (QIP)—National Revolutionary Party—in Peshawar was a natural result of the split that took place within the Awami National Party (ANP) when it entered into a controversial understanding with the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). As the ANP itself was a conglomerate of several parties with well defined progressive views, the exodus of the activists that took place was primarily based on the withdrawal of some of the original coalescing organisations. Thus it was not merely a group of dissidents who were quitting, but many of the half a dozen merging parties and including some of the loyalists of Mr. Wali Khan.

Consequently the setting up of the QIP followed a natural course as the dissidents in themselves represented a cohesive organisation, in that numerically they could not be considered splinter elements. The successful September 14 caucus brought together four like minded organisations to form the QIP. These were the Communist Party faction of Hasan Rafiq, Aizaz Nazir's Inquilabi Jamhoori Party, Watan Dost Party of Dr. Arbab Khawar and the ANP dissidents group. The new left party consequently has started with an advantage of being a nationally representative party, with roots in all areas of the country. This is an improvement on many of

the other progressive parties which are still confined to specific areas or have marginal representation elsewhere. The very large turnout at the meeting of representatives from all over Pakistan thus places it in a slot of eminence as far as the other left parties are concerned. It is quite likely that in the future, if the QIP emerges as a strong united party, its ranks will swell with the merger of more progressive parties, whose polemics are not much different from the QIP's.

So far the QIP has announced a four-point programme which is common to almost all progressive parties. Much of its manifesto too runs along the traditional lines of leftist parties. However, the party's Secretary General Afrasiab Khattak specifically defined the aims of the party. He made it clear that the party would oppose any attempt to export or import revolution by any state. The other important point was that "our aim would be to bring about a revolution through a democratic struggle and give people their rights in furtherance of socialist ideals." This makes it evident that the party will follow the historic process of a democratic revolution, which makes its approach somewhat different from that adopted by a section of the left earlier.

#### **Karachi Police Brand MQM 'Terrorists'**

46000031A Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 26 Sep 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Kamran Khan]

[Text] Karachi, Sept. 25—In sharp contrast to the position held by Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, some key players in the Sindh administration have written analyses saying that "Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) is an organised terrorist force."

This correspondent obtained an analysis written by the Karachi Police Chief, Mr. Afzal Shigri, in which he said that MQM is a "semi-guerilla organisation" committed to the destruction of the country.

Notwithstanding MQM's historic election victory in December last year and its signing of an accord with the ruling PPP [Pakistan People's Party], the Karachi Police Chief and another senior security official posted in Karachi have been making implicit requests to the government to ban MQM, according to some high-placed political and official sources.

"The cold-blooded fratricide, qualifies MQM as a group bent upon destruction of the country" wrote Afzal Shigri in a report to the government, only a couple of weeks before the elections last year.

In an implicit plea for a massive crackdown on MQM just before the elections, the Karachi police urged the government to find if MQM is "a tool in the hands of RAW [Research and Analysis Wing] or KGB."

In the report which was received at the Provincial Secretariat in Karachi in early November the Karachi Police Chief wrote "That in front-line MQM holds a

sober and national face," while "the underground" activists indulge in "terrorism and sabotage" with what the Karachi Police Chief described as "mathematical accuracy."

Sources interviewed for the story said that the Karachi Police Chief along with another senior security official, who is also understood to have penned numerous reports of a similar nature for Islamabad officials, pursued their "terrorist theory" more vigorously when a new government under PPP took charge.

Informed sources said that due to this constant misinformation, the PPP Government allowed security agencies to continue with the telephone tapping of MQM's headquarters and at the house of its leader Altaf Hussain. Constant surveillance of MQM leaders and some important activists by the police special branch and the DIB is still continuing.

In the first half of this year Mr. Shigri remained busy on a course at the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA), but within a few weeks of the completion of the course, the Sindh Chief Minister re-installed him as the Karachi Police Chief.

Junior police officers, at police station level, acknowledge that the top police command in Karachi still consider MQM as a "terrorist outfit" and not the representative of the city where it had grabbed more than 80 percent of seats in national and provincial assembly elections.

Interestingly, the Karachi Police Chief, while considering MQM as a semi-guerilla organisation also complained in a written report that much of the MQM's terrorism, violence and sabotage is "directed against police."

For many years the city police, with its involvement in outrageous corruption, absolute failure in detection of crimes and non-local composition, has become a symbol of resentment for Karachiites. Never in the last 15 years has the city had a Karachi domiciled officer as the police chief.

City police officials have been found to be involved in cases of robbery, tripple murders, sabotage and drug trafficking over the last several years, according to a report prepared for the provincial government on police involvement in crimes.

MQM leaders who had been consistently demanding the arrest of gangs who had massacred hundreds of innocent citizens in Aligarh Colony in December 1976 and in Surjani Town in early 1987 have charged that police was conniving with the murderers as most of these dreaded dramas of murder and arson were enacted in the full presence of the police.

Since winning elections last year PPP leader Ms. Benazir Bhutto on several occasions has commended the role of MQM in strengthening democracy in the country but on many occasions she has been surprised to note that no

significant progress has been made in the PPP-MQM Accord despite an agreement between the top leaders of the two parties.

It is believed that the goodwill between the top leaders never travels to the key officials who have to make day-to-day decisions.

Not only the key officials in police and a security agency are prejudiced against MQM, but some ministers and advisers in Sindh Government are seen destroying the goodwill created by the Prime Minister.

It was intriguing to note that at the time when the Prime Minister was briefing the journalists in Karachi last month about the positive role played by the movement in strengthening democracy, an aide to the Chief Minister was telling journalists that MQM leaders are "blood suckers."

#### **Punjab Government Terms NPT Papers 'Disinformation Cells'**

46000033B Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 28 Sep 89 p 8

[Text] Lahore, Sept. 27—A spokesman of the Punjab Government has regretted that the disinformation cell of the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] has launched a campaign of provocative and baseless news reports against the Punjab Government in order to mislead the people.

The spokesman citing the examples of such news reports published mainly in the federally-controlled National Press Trust [NPT] newspapers said that only in the previous two days, following baseless news items have been published:

- A misleading news item was published in NPT papers alleging that Punjab Government was introducing its own currency. This provocative news was drafted by an Advisor to the Prime Minister and was published in the NPT papers.
- In today's newspaper the disinformation cell has got published the news item in which it has been said that the Chief Minister Punjab in a meeting with Hafeez Pirzada has appreciated the idea of confederation whereas the fact was that the Pakistan Muslim League and the Chief Minister Punjab under the Constitution believed in strong federation and demanded only such powers for the provinces as have been provided in the Constitution. Moreover, no meeting between Hafeez Pirzada and Chief Minister Punjab has taken place.
- In today's NPT newspapers another news item has been published by the disinformation cell according to which Punjab Government will publish its own postal stamps. But it is a well-known fact that the Postal Department was a central subject and no provincial government can even think of publishing its own postal stamps.
- An English NPT newspapers of Lahore has published a cartoon made by an advisor to the Prime Minister in

which different standard times have been mentioned between radio Punjab and Islamabad.

- The disinformation cells of the PPP has also launched a well-coordinated campaign against senior officers of federal cadre working in Punjab and has accused them of involvement in politics.

The official spokesman has requested the enlightened people of the country to take notice of the misleading news items being published by the disinformation cell of the PPP and decide for themselves whether the Federal Government of PPP was doing any service to the country or was working against the interests of the country. The spokesman said that it seemed that by publishing such cartoons and news items a line was being given to the protagonists of Sindhu Desh.—PR

#### **Provincial Autonomy Said Serious Policy Challenge**

46000032A Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 26 Sep 89 pp 1, 6

[Article by Anwar Iqbal in "News Focus" column: "Sindhi Nationalists Put PPP to the Test"]

[Text] Islamabad, Sept. 25—The proposed motion on provincial autonomy in the Senate and National Assembly could put the PPP [Pakistan People's Party] government in an embarrassing situation.

The motion was proposed and prepared by Sindhi nationalists both on the treasury and opposition benches as well as those outside parliament. It asks for delegation of all powers to provinces except foreign affairs, defence, communication, currency and customs.

So far this is the first serious policy challenge to the ruling party coming from a province which helped it come to power with its unprecedented support in the November elections.

And it hurts the party where it feels most vulnerable, i.e., provincial autonomy. While in the opposition, the PPP itself was one of the champions of this cause. It even signed an agreement with other MRD [Movement for the Restoration of Democracy] parties granting most of the rights to provinces that the Sindhi nationalists are now demanding.

But the nationalists, inside the party as well as outside, feel that once in power the PPP became a centrist party to the extent that it even refused to call a meeting of the Provincial Coordination Council.

This resulted in an unfavourable reaction among Sindhi nationalists and advocates of autonomy in other smaller provinces and even in Punjab which for the first time since independence faces an opponent part in power at the centre. People in the Sindh National Alliance (SNA) and Jeay Sindh availed this opportunity to attack a party which gave them a humiliating defeat in elections.



But the possible repercussions of PPP's centrist policies did not necessarily end there. It also seems to have disillusioned some of its MNA [Member of National Assembly], Senators and local leaders in Sindh. People like Makhdoun Khaliqzaman criticised the party openly for centrist approach.

This also helped a group of MNAs within the party to form their separate group in the name of provincial autonomy. Most of these MNAs have complaints of a personal nature against party leadership such as a lack of share in power, problems with local bodies and irrigation and agriculture departments etc. But the issue of provincial autonomy provided them with a "respectable" platform to attack the party leadership.

People like Abdul Hafiz Pirzada and Ejaz Jatoi described PPP's centrist policies as "betrayal of Sindh" and appealed to the people of Sindh to wage a campaign against the Centre for their rights. They very cleverly avoided words like Bhutto and PPP government in their attack on the Centre.

Some SNA politicians decided to take the issue to parliament with the help of the PPP renegade group and opposition members including some from the IJI [Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad].

They knew that a parliamentary debate on provincial autonomy could put the PPP in the most embarrassing position. Because of its support in Sindh, the party would not like to publicly oppose a bill on provincial autonomy. But if it supports it, the PPP could undermine its standing in the establishment, which is obviously pro-centre.

Giving more power to the province of Sindh could also jeopardise its fragile alliance with the MQM [Muhajir Qaumi Movement] which would not like more power in the hand of its rival Sindhi nationalists.

But the PPP's immediate concern is neither Sindhi nationalists nor the MQM. It is the IJI government in Punjab. More provincial autonomy would also mean more powers for Nawaz Sharif and could further weaken the party's position in Punjab.

It is for this reason that some IJI politicians too are supporting the demand for provincial autonomy. They realise that this would further strengthen their hands in their fight against PPP controlled Islamabad.

And the possibility of Punjab's support over the autonomy issue is one of the main reasons that some Sindhi nationalist politicians are pushing for it now. They realise that because of the present peculiar situation, Punjab would not oppose provincial autonomy with the same vigour that it did in the past. With a neutral, if not supportive Punjab they hope to get at least part of their demand accepted.

But if the PPP puts its foot down and says no to provincial autonomy, the nationalists in Sindh would then try to whip up anti-PPP sentiment in the province

over the issue. They are so certain of their success in turning the people of Sindh against the PPP if it opposes provincial autonomy that Hafiz Pirzada even talked of "mid-term elections" claiming it will be the Sindhi nationalists who would win the next elections.

### Improvements Seen in Status of Women

46000032B Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 27 Sep 89 p 4

[Article by Hafizur Rahman: "Treating Women Like Equal Citizens of Pakistan"]

[Text] Witness two stages in the progress that women have made in two developing countries which happen to be close neighbours (though not the best of friends). This is from two recent reports in the press.

One. The Government of Pakistan has announced that henceforth there will be no restriction on women's participation in sports activities, either within the country or outside.

### No Comparison

Two. An all-women crew operated a regular flight of the Indian Airlines on Saturday (September 16). The Boeing 737 jetliner flew from Bombay to Goa, captained by Saudamini Deshmukh. The flight engineers and other normally male crew were also women. Captain Deshmukh has worked for the state-run airlines since 1980.

I will now refer to the story from the USA, where, according to another news report, a small town in the state of Tennessee is being run almost entirely by women. Six of the public posts, including that of the mayor, the police commissioner and the health and sanitation boss, are held by elected women. The story said that the men of the town had no complaints against the women officials.

But I don't think this story is relevant for our purpose, because the respective stages of feminine involvement in public affairs, in the United States and in India-Pakistan, do not lend themselves to comparison. There is a vast gulf between the two, which is unbridgeable for the simple reason that by the time we reach the American stage (if at all our obscurantists let us do that), that country would have gone still farther ahead.

While the Indian story about the female airline crew puts some women of that country more than ten years in advance of its own educated and technically qualified women, the Pakistan story depicts the pathetic attempt by the ruling regime to pull up women's sports from where its predecessor regime dropped it more than ten years ago. Since in the matter of games and athletics our girls were already some ten years behind India in 1977, General Zia's orders to stop women playing in public put this country a mere twenty years behind its closest neighbour. Now we first have to undo the effects of the

General's whimsical fiat, before we can even dream of our girls competing with Indian girls at the same level of competence.

Defenders of the late General will say, so what? We see no harm if our girls don't play hockey or don't take part in athletic meets. Our girls should not be doing these things. The simple answer to this is that unless you are totally against the education of women, then you cannot restrict their progress in one field and let it proceed unhindered in others. It is not possible that on the one hand our girls should be allowed to become engineers and acquire specialised technical qualifications—and ultimately fly a PIA Airliner if they want to—and on the other they should be stopped from running competitively on the track or have an all-women hockey match to amuse themselves and exercise their limbs.

#### Exercise

By the way, is there a medical or health expert among the obscurantists who can definitively lay down the law in this respect and say that only Muslim young men need bodily exercise and Muslim young women don't? Do the latter have an in-built biological mechanism which can take the place of exercise? Is the female body self-exercising while the male body is required to submit itself to some form of physical activity in order to remain fit?

We are not likely to get a reply to this, because such questions are never taken notice of by those to whom they are addressed. If they are not altogether ignored, the replies are vague and irrelevant and clothed in quasi-theological arguments for which no endorsement can be found in the holy books.

So, up till the Pakistan Government decision to lift the ban on female sports, the situation was that, under the Constitution, we could have a woman Prime Minister, but we couldn't have a woman hockey player or a potential sprinting champion competing in an international (or even national) event in athletics. Jumping over hurdles or throwing the javelin or doing the pole vault were most indecent acts in which no self-respecting Pakistani could see his women indulge. Of course, the self-respecting Pakistani was expected to laugh in Mochi Gate at dirty, scurrilous and uncivilised jokes made at the expense of venerated women leaders. That was different.

But seriously, it's a great thing to have a woman Prime Minister in the country. So many inhibitions, nursed sedulously so far, now sound pointless and asinine. (Admittedly, some new ones have cropped up, but they are the products of twisted minds.) So many curbs and checks on women just drop away by themselves.

Not only that, the entire attitude to Pakistan's place in the world undergoes a change, and you feel that the country is really being propelled into the twenty-first

century. And for the first time we have an honest interpretation of chaddar aur chardivari, Mochi Gate notwithstanding.

#### Better Generation, Distribution of Power Urged

46000034C Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 27 Sep 89 pp 4, 5

[Text] Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's directive to the WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] to complete all the nine energy projects underway in time, suggests that the government is determined to bridge the wide gap between energy supply and demand as early as possible. This is an improvement on the situation obtaining in the past several years when scant attention was paid to this problem resulting in a shortage in power that seriously affected agricultural and industrial development. The crash-programme that was initiated in the last one year through WAPDA and private sector is probably designed to reduce the shortage, not eliminate it altogether.

WAPDA, which has a virtual monopoly on generation and distribution of electric power, apparently has not been able to meet the challenge of increasing demands. Whatever may be the reasons for it, it has certainly created a serious power crisis, the pinch of which is being felt at present. The instant measures that the government has ordered, might be able to marginally improve the situation, but can hardly be looked upon as the final solution.

Although it would be somewhat unfair to suggest that WAPDA has failed in its commitment, there is no doubt that there is a need to augment WAPDA's efforts by inducting other interested quarters into the task of generating and distributing power. The government has already opened the sector to private enterprise including foreign investors which is still in a planning stage. But, there is no reason to believe that private and foreign capital will be able to ensure cheap power, or at least within the tariff structure worked out by WAPDA.

Probably a better solution would be to relieve WAPDA of some of its responsibility of supplying power to urban areas in the country and hand the task to the provinces. This would free WAPDA to generate power and distribute it to bulk industrial consumers and the agricultural sector. Provincial governments should be encouraged to set up their own organisations on the lines of WAPDA to generate electricity by means other than hydro-power, and to distribute it to the big and small urban centres in the provinces. Most of the provinces should be in a position to take up manageable projects for generating electricity from whatever sources are available within the province. The NWFP [North-West Frontier Province] government could well exploit the till now untapped resources of hydro-power potential available from its many rivers in its northern areas. Since WAPDA normally thinks in big terms, a number of smaller schemes can be drawn up which have till now been ignored by it.

Punjab and Sindh have sufficient coal resources to produce thermal power for their requirements. The efforts made till now to exploit the coal reserves apparently have not been taken up seriously. A provincial government troubled by intermittent power shortage will be in a better position to undertake such a crash programme. Similarly, Balochistan too can be encouraged to generate and distribute its own power, rather than depending on the good graces of WAPDA, whose slender supply line devolves on a grid system.

The demand of the provinces for greater autonomy could be partly met by allowing them to manage their own power distribution and generation systems as well. Given the present state of provinces' finances, none of them will be able to take up such projects, unless and until the centre evolves a new revenue-sharing formula, which will funnel some of the funds intended for WAPDA, to the provinces. That would be a far more feasible method of utilising the development funds for power generation than passing them all on to WAPDA, which has reached a stage where it is incapable of satisfying the needs of the provinces.

Local or foreign capital which is interested in generating power should be required to deal with the provinces rather than the centre of WAPDA. A provincial government is the best judge of its own power needs and would be better placed to undertake such planning, rather than to rely on an agency whose efforts at best amount to spreading the butter very thin across the slice. The government should study some such option seriously, as it has become obvious that centralising the generation and distribution of power has proved to be a failure.

### UN Completes Kalabagh Dam Study

46000034B Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 26 Oct 89 p 10

[Text] Karachi, Oct. 25—The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has completed a feasibility study for the proposed Kalabagh dam and new studies have been initiated for a barrage at Ghazi Ghariala and a dam at Basha in the NWFP [North-West Frontier Province]. For the latter UNDP is making efforts to establish a consortium of donors in order to meet the large pre-investment costs.

According to a UNDP's latest report, apart from its involvement in the energy sector, feasibility studies were also undertaken by the World Bank for more dams. Citing a well known 1988 study "energy for a sustainable world," the bank reports that developing countries will need more than three times their current hydro-electric capacity by the year 2020.

Even that might be too low an estimate, the bank says, since air pollution could block much of the untapped coal reserves which otherwise could provide an alternative. It argues that large dams were often be the least costly way to create the needed energy.

However, the natural resources defence council has found reasons to oppose dams over 100 metres high, ranging from water-borne diseases spread via reservoirs to increased siltation, down-stream erosion, and loss of valuable forests through construction. They felt that the bank was wrong to favour costly dams for low-income countries.

The bank's report cites several previously financed dams that turned out to be nightmares. Among them: the Akosombo dam in Ghana, which prompted a river blindness epidemic and the Aswan high dam in Egypt, whose over-ambitious irrigation scheme created a five million hectare swamp that subsequently had to undergo expensive draining.

Arguing in its own defence, the bank says that it recently helped delay the start of proposed dams that would have destroyed scenic natural areas like Nam Choan in Thailand, Murchison falls in Uganda and three gorges in China. Another is that bank's intervention supposedly improved others that could have been worse, like El Cajon in Honduras and Pehuenche in Chile.

Even with extraordinary progress in conservation, the World Bank says there will have to be lots of new dams built throughout the third world.—PPI

### Article Comments on General Beg Interview

46000033A Islamabad THE MUSLIM  
in English 24 Sep 89 pp 4, 5

[Article by Akbar Naqvi: "It's the COAS's Word Against Our Fear"]

[Text] General Mirza Aslam Beg's more than two hours question and answer session with the press was both timely and radical. He chose to do something unprecedented to assure the nation that the news of a failed coup floated by London's FINANCIAL TIMES was unfounded. The occasion was also used to take people into his confidence on the unprecedentedly large and complex army exercise, two hundred kilometres within our eastern border, which will be held in the next few months. What could have been done through a terse press release was given a format in which the Army Chief exposed himself to unrehearsed questions from the press, and acquitted himself with ease as well as candour.

This was the way of the top soldier, who believes that the true strategic depth of the country is in the people's heart. He came to them with right words, when they needed to be reassured about the Armed Forces' commitment to democracy. He also used the occasion to speak on the Army's pre-occupation with professional matters in defence of the country's territorial integrity. It is extraordinary that the Army Chief had to do what the Prime Minister, who is also the Defence Minister, should have done. But given the circumstances in which we have been living, it is only the COAS who could have spoken for the Armed Forces, and his country-wide



listeners would not have trusted the credibility of words coming from any other quarter on a matter of the most anxious concern.

Apart from removing our anxiety about the imminence of yet another martial law in the country, which in his words would "mess up the whole thing," he declared that he and the Armed Forces were subordinate to the civilian government. In clear words he said that it was the collective decision of the army high command to lend weight to the country's democratic process, despite pressures from "various quarters including Sindh" for intervention. But, he added, that "it is not the responsibility of the Army to intervene and correct things" which must take place constitutionally and democratically.

### Military Unity

He spoke of the "corrective mechanism" of democracy which should come into play automatically rather than the Army taking over political responsibilities outside its mandate and professional competence. As if nothing should have been left wanting in his words for democracy, he went to the extent of telling us that he never performed any martial law duty in his whole career, and this was also true of many of his colleagues in the high command. In speaking about Zarbe Momin, and in his comments that the 1965 and 1971 Wars should not have been fought the way they were (let us recall under a Field Marshal and a Commander-in-Chief who were ruling the country then), he was telling us that when an Army is not professionally occupied in training and exercising for the defence of the country, it ends up messing around both with the affairs of the state as well as war.

It is ironic that the COAS's words should bring disquieting thoughts to our mind. We have here one man's words against a long history of Army rule in the country. General Beg's assurance that the collective strength of the Army high command was backing the democratic process in the country was not as comforting as hoped for. The reason is that Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and finally General Ziaul Haq took over power through unlawful actions and ruled the country, with the support of their associates in the highest echelons as well as the rank and file of the Army. It can be said that in lending support to General Aslam Beg's initiative, the Army high command is only living up to its tradition of monolithic unity, and that a new COAS with some other compulsions would be an equal beneficiary of the same.

There was nothing in General Beg's words to make us believe that a transformation in favour of democracy has taken place in the Army itself. On the contrary, what came out clearly was that a body of professionals stood guard over democracy because its leaders have decided to do this for reasons of their own, and that it could be led without question in directions determined at the highest level of command. General Mirza Aslam Beg's words may be very precious to live for in a situation in which a large number of politicians would love yet another martial law for the simple reason that they have

done well under it in the past. But it is one man's word against past history and present machinations to subvert the democratic process, and the thought is never far from our mind that in a few years he will be due for retirement.

When this happens, we will need similar words of reassurance from another COAS. The imminence of martial law under emergency, declared by those who take over power, is built in within our history, politics and personal conduct. Repeated failures of both civilian and martial law rules in the country which have brought us to our present state, must give way to a change for the better. Therefore, in the current phase of experiment with democracy, the COAS's declaration that he and his colleagues support it unconditionally gives us nothing more than time to make good on the promises of the November elections.

### Transformation?

It is not really up to the Armed Forces to ensure that there will be no martial law in the country in future. Nor is this possible, aside from declaration of interest and dedication. It is for us to make this decision and work for it. The opportunity for this today may not be as apocalyptic as the Prime Minister's father had, and she may never be called upon to play the same messianic role either. But the Armed Forces' active support in favour of civilian rule and democracy is as good a start as it was following the fall of Dhaka. But the time to get democracy on its feet here is not for ever. Within the next few years we have to show that the system, which came into existence after the demise of a democracy-hating autocrat from the Army, possesses the viability to survive until the next election from whence it can take on an independent life of its own.

It is only when this happens, that the Army will find its true place, and a transformation will take place in the thought and behaviour of its personnel across the board as well as working its way to the tip of its hierarchy. A democratically anchored Army is not created by its high command. It arises from a system in which people's will is sacrosanct, and every institution of the state and society is subordinate to it. Above this, according to our faith, is God's will, which no one but the people themselves exercise on His behalf. In this system there is no scope or room for Army adventurers who rise as reformers and end up as power-hungry tyrants.

It is up to our politicians, then, who as the people's representative, must dedicate themselves to the task of establishing democracy in the country. If political indiscipline grows worse, if the clash between the Centre and the provinces weakens the State to the extent that its very security is threatened, if the law and order situation worsens further beyond hope of control, if politicians favouring the rule of yet another General succeed in their design under patriotic slogans, if so many other "ifs" dangerous for democracy continue to operate openly or in the dark in our midst, then it is possible that even

General Mirza Aslam Beg would have to give second thought to the "corrective mechanism" of democracy. The situation is that while we believe him, we do not have the same confidence in our abilities to adjust to the freedoms and discipline of democracy. If we know our history well, we will remember that Generals were made bold to seize the reins of the State and government when politicians were found to have lost complete control over themselves and their responsibilities. The unlawful acts of the Armed Forces have been matched in our past with the betrayal of trust by politicians. The nation is on test, and the COAS has declared where the Army stands. It is up to the politicians to cooperate and give democracy a chance again.

### Commentary Criticizes Lack of Price Controls

90OI0006A Karachi JANG in Urdu 21 Sep 89 p 3

[Article by Agha Masood Hussain: "Inflation and the People's Problems"]

[Text] Along with electricity rates, the prices of all of the goods made in the country have been raised 20-50 percent, and this increase will be borne by the common man. When on 3 June 1989 the budget for the new financial year was presented, the minister of state for finance announced that a mini budget will not be introduced in order to make up for the coming deficit or in search of new resources. But the rise in electricity rates is not just a mini budget, it has also seriously upset the common man's domestic budget. At the moment, inflation is terrible and every day there are unwarranted increases in the prices of items of daily consumption. The price of pulse, sugar, fat, flour, meat, in other words, the items of daily use for a common man, have touched sky high. This country has no agency for controlling or stabilizing prices, because there is no one to pay any attention to the question of stopping inflation. In this context, there is no consumer resistance in the country. In our neighboring country, India, if prices are raised even a penny for any item, the people lay a siege on the government and do not give up until the prices are rolled back, but there is no such tradition here. In the palmiest days of democracy, organized protests against inflation were rarely staged. Therefore, the traders keep raising the prices to their heart's content, and the people keep paying these prices, and thus inflation keeps marching from strength to strength.

Inflation directly affects the employees, the workers, and the farmers, and among the employees, the low-income people. Because the workers and the farmers are two of the most oppressed classes, they are the ones most affected by inflation, and it is also noticed that the poor here have larger numbers of children. That is why there are millions of those who do not get even two square meals a day. If production rises, inflation begins to lose its impact. But in two of the largest cities of Pakistan, Karachi and Hyderabad, industrial progress has been seriously hit by unending rioting. As a result of this, not only has production fallen, but the workers have lost jobs

because of the closure of certain factories. Even the ordinary shopkeeper has been affected by Karachi's curfew, and the small industries have closed down. Because of this, economic activity in the city has been hard hit. In the wake of inflation, there has been a sharp increase in the price of medicine. While life saving drugs are unavailable, and even when they are available, their prices are so high as to put the drugs beyond the reach of the common man. Even in the major hospitals, medicines are unavailable and the medicines prescribed by the doctors are so costly that a poor man cannot buy them. In the rural areas, where treatment facilities are fewer compared to the cities, obtaining treatment is almost impossible. A poor person is not in a position to take any steps to end inflation. As far as the government is concerned, it too has no way of ending inflation. It has already failed in controlling lawlessness, and is helpless in the face of growing inflation. The rate of increase of the money supply is over 20 percent, and the value of the rupee is falling very rapidly. Drug money and black money, between them, have ruined the economic balance of the country. Only one class has money, while a majority of the people are have-nots and penniless.

Now, because of the rise in the power rates, daily-used articles will also be affected. As I noted above, the capitalists have increased the prices of all articles by 20-50 percent, and the burden of this increase will fall directly on the common man. Regarding the increase in electricity rates, the government's stand is that this step had to be taken, because the previous administration had made a promise to the IMF that it would be done. This explanation of the government is very correct but the previous administration, being an unrepresentative one, was not answerable to the people, but the present government is directly answerable to the people. Therefore, it should have entered into negotiations with the IMF once more in order to arrive at a formula that would preclude the need to increase the electricity rates. The big problem with the present government is that, on the one hand, it keeps criticizing the previous government and, on the other hand, it is embracing all of those policies. One has a feeling that the present government does not have any clear plans for improving the economic condition. If it had any such plans, it would never, never have permitted WAPDA [Water and Power Development Authority] to increase the electricity rates. The curse of inflation has not been let loose because of the government's wrong policies alone. This has also happened because of the activities of certain antisocial elements. For instance, inflation also picks up because of the hoarding of daily-needed articles. In Pakistan, there is no shortage of hoarders. Given an opportunity, they would starve the people by hoarding all articles of daily need. The Rise in the price of sugar is one manifestation of hoarding. In fact, inflation is one cause of the people's frustration. Apart from this, there are other problems also which have rendered the people miserable. Even then, the government's first duty is to end the people's frustrations by controlling and indeed reducing inflation, with the help of better and more effective policies.

Democracy cannot succeed without the people's prosperity. If there is unrest among the people, and if they have to suffer inflation, in that case, there cannot be much love lost between them and democracy. On the contrary, they will become indifferent to the democratic process. The reason for the social disintegration that occurred during General Zia's regime was that the people had become indifferent to the political process, and this indifference is the greatest enemy of economic health and economic progress. Karl Marx has written somewhere that, "poverty is the mother of unrest and, in turn, unrest breeds either revolt or revolution". In recent times, the Iranian revolution is an example of this. While the Shah and his small majority were leading a life of regal splendor, poverty and want were haunting the villages. A great revolution appeared in the form of Imam Khomeini, and the great ivory towers came tumbling to the ground in the twinkling of an eye. In our society also, the common man is being crushed. Linguistic politics has done serious damage to economic and industrial progress and, on top of this, the amazing thing is that democracy is not being permitted to function and, from every corner, there are cries being raised that the problems should be immediately solved. This cry is not

meaningless and the cry is also being raised because, in an atmosphere of democracy and freedom, the people's expectations tend to rise but democracy needs patience and patience is also needed because it takes time to set the house in order. Without a firm and lasting alliance between democracy and economic prosperity, democracy can not flourish, nor can economic progress be possible. In this alliance lies the secret of a prosperous Pakistan, and only through this alliance can the economic conditions be improved by waging a struggle against the antisocial elements. The government can win the hearts of the people by reducing inflation. In a public meeting on 6 November, Benazir had warned those raising the price of sugar that they should reduce the prices, otherwise action will be taken against them. Were that such remarks were issued against those indulging in hoarding, so that food stuffs may come out of black houses and people may get these articles on cheap rates. The advisors of the present government should advise the shopkeepers not to raise the prices of food articles arbitrarily, and the government should be asked to withdraw the increase in power rates, otherwise inflation will increase still faster and the people's frustrations will increase further.



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